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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-Noerr-Pennington Immunity for Joint
Efforts to Influence Governmental Action-Intent
to Cause Competitive Injury, Evidenced by Re-
peated, Baseless Opposition Before an Adjudica-
tory Body, Does Not Result in Loss of Noerr-
Pennington Immunity Absent Specific Allegations
of Conduct External to or Abusive of the Adjudica-
tory Processes
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs, two subsidiaries of McDonald's Corporation,,
brought suit in federal district court 2 claiming that defendants, a
labor union and two associations of restaurant and hotel employers,
had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act3 by conspiring to oppose
repeatedly, baselessly, and in bad faith a municipal board's ap-
proval of building permits for the construction of McDonald's res-
taurants.4 Defendants asserted that their joint efforts to influence
the board were immune from antitrust attack under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine 5 and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim. Plaintiffs countered by contending that defendants'
groundless opposition was designed to foreclose plaintiffs' access to
the municipal board with the ultimate purpose of suppressing plain-
1. The two subsidiaries were Franchise Realty Interstate Corporation and McDonald's
Systems of California, hereinafter referred to collectively as McDonald's.
2. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.
3. Section 1 provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
4. Plaintiffs had applied for and been granted permits for the construction of three
restaurants by the San Francisco Department of Public Works. Defendants successfully per-
suaded the San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals to overrule and deny the issuance of these
permits pursuant to § 3.651 of the Charter of the City of San Francisco. This charter provision
sets forth the functions, powers, and duties of the Board of Permit Appeals:
[A]ny person who deems that his interests or property or that the general public interest
will be adversely affected as a result of operations authorized by or under any permit or
license granted or issued by any department may appeal to the board of permit appeals.
Defendants' conduct before this board of appeals forms the subject matter of the instant
litigation.
5. The development of the Noerr-Pennington immunity is traced in section II of this
Comment.
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tiffs' activities as a competitor' and thus fell within the "sham ex-
ception" to the Noerr-Pennington defense. The trial court found
that the alleged conduct enjoyed Noerr-Pennington immunity and
granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed. The bare
allegation that repeated joint efforts to influence a governmental
body are nothing more than a scheme to injure a competitor and to
foreclose its access to an administrative agency does not state a
claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act without further specific
allegations of activities external to or abusive of the adjudicatory
process that tend to harass and deter the competitor from having
free and unlimited access to the agency. Franchise Realty Interstate
Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3626 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1977) (No. 76-1023).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. ,8 the Supreme Court first conferred antitrust immunity
on joint efforts to influence state legislatures and executives. In
Noerr a number of long-distance trucking companies brought an
antitrust action9 against a group of railroads alleging that the defen-
dants jointly had conducted a publicity campaign to secure passage
and enforcement of laws favorable to the railroads and competi-
tively disadvantageous to the trucking industry. ' ° The Court held
unanimously that the railroads' conduct was immune from antitrust
6. The additional relevant allegations of the complaint may be summarized as follows:
defendants agreed to oppose every permit granted to plaintiffs by the Department of Public
Works and to threaten withdrawal of political support for any Board member who voted to
sustain issuance of permits to plaintiffs. Defendants knew their opposition to be groundless
in that they were aware plaintiffs had complied with all relevant building requirements.
Furthermore, defendants induced the Board to exceed its constitutional authority and to
assume the improper role of an economic review board with the power to determine what
competition would exist in San Francisco. 542 F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 1976).
7. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' first amended complaint without leave to amend
under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and also denied plaintiffs' post-judgment motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint, which the instant court described as adding nothing but
adjectives to the first complaint, under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and 50(b)(6).
8. 365 U.S. 127, rehearing denied, 365 U.S. 875 (1961).
9. The action was brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). 365 U.S.
at 129.
10. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that defendants' campaign induced the Governor of
Pennsylvania to veto the "Fair Truck Bill," which would have allowed trucks to carry heavier
loads on Pennsylvania highways. Plaintiffs further alleged that the campaign was calculated
to impair the general reputation of the trucking industry and to dissuade customers from
using trucking as a method of long-distance freight transportation. Id. at 130.
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scrutiny, notwithstanding that the campaign was carried out for
anticompetitive purposes, that it was conducted in a deceptive and
unethical manner," and that it was responsible for inflicting direct
competitive injury unrelated to the passage or enforcement of laws. '2
Two main considerations formed the basis of the Noerr Court's ra-
tionale. First, the Court reasoned that since valid state action hav-
ing an anticompetitive effect enjoys antitrust immunity,' 3 joint ef-
forts to induce the legislature or executive to take such action should
have corresponding immunity." Secondly, although the Court ex-
pressly declined to decide whether the first amendment right to
petition encompassed joint lobbying efforts, the Court found no
mandate in the legislative history of the antitrust laws to impute to
the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate conduct that was at least
arguably protected by the first amendment. 5 The Court noted, how-
ever, that its ruling was limited to "genuine efforts" to influence
governmental action and would not extend to a publicity campaign
that was "a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor.""
The antitrust immunity conferred in Noerr was reinforced and
expanded in United Mine Workers v. Pennington." In Pennington
a small coal company alleged that a labor union had conspired with
a number of large coal producers to persuade the Secretary of Labor
to set high minimum wages for the companies from which the Ten-
11. The railroads hired a public relations firm to generate seemingly spontaneous state-
ments from fictitious public interest groups. Id. at 129-30.
12. In this regard the Court noted:
It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence the legislation by a campaign
of publicity, that an incidental effect of that campaign may be the infliction of some
direct injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed. And
it seems equally inevitable that those conducting the campaign would be aware of, and
possibly even pleased by, the prospect of such injury. To hold that the knowing infliction
of such injury renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be tantamount to outlawing
all such campaigns.
Id. at 143-44.
13. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307
U.S. 533 (1939).
14. The thrust of this argument was that the unrestricted flow of ideas, even if decep-
tively or unethically presented, was vital to the proper functioning of representative govern-
ment.
15. Underlying both aspects of the Court's analysis was the belief that the central
concern of the Sherman Act was "business activity" such as price-fixing, market division,
and boycotts. Defendants' "political activity" was so "essentially dissimilar" to the tradi-
tional Sherman Act offenses that although the conduct was clearly reprehensible, it simply
fell outside the scope of Congress' antitrust policy. 365 U.S. at 136-37.
16. Id. at 144.
17. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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nessee Valley Authority purchased coal and to induce the TVA itself
to curtail its practice of making spot purchases of coal from small
coal producers. Although recognizing the union's anticompetitive
purpose, the Court extended the Noerr immunity to include joint
attempts to influence the policy decisions of public officials as well
as joint efforts to lobby for the passage and enforcement of statutes.
After Noerr and Pennington the question remained whether the
antitrust immunity for joint efforts to influence governmental policy
making applied with equal force to efforts to secure favorable rulings
from administrative and judicial bodies. In California a district
court dismissed a complaint"8 in which a group of trucking compa-
nies alleged that a group of competing highway carriers had pooled
financial resources in order to fund a program of continual, indis-
criminate opposition to the plaintiffs' applications for operating
rights before the California Public Utilities Commission and the
Interstate Commerce Commission. 9 The trial court held that the
Noerr-Pennington immunity was fully operative in the adjudicative
setting. Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed" and declared that the Noerr-Pennington immunity was in-
applicable to efforts to influence the administrative process. Fi-
nally, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute in California Motor
Transit Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.2' Echoing Noerr's concern for
preserving the flow of information from citizens to the government
and for protecting first amendment rights,22 the Court concluded
that the same rationale safeguards the access of citizens to adminis-
trative agencies.? Although approving the district court's extension
of the Noerr immunity to adjudicatory proceedings, the Court af-
firmed the Ninth Circuit's order remanding the case for trial on the
grounds that the plaintiffs' allegations came within the Noerr
"sham" exception as adapted to the adjudicatory context.24 The
exact line of reasoning by which the Court reached this conclusion
is difficult to reconstruct. Central to the Court's argument, however,
was the notion that whereas unethical conduct in the "political
18. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,298
(N.D. Cal. 1967).
19. Plaintiffs also alleged that in order to deny plaintiffs' access to the administrative
process, defendants instituted proceedings regardless of probable cause and the merits of the
cases and that defendants publicized their scheme generally and communicated threats of
continued opposition directly to plaintiffs.
20. 432 F.2d 755 (1970).
21. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
22. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
23. 404 U.S. at 510.
24. Id. at 516.
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arena" is clearly immunized from antitrust attack under Noerr,
"reprehensible practice[s] . ..may corrupt the administrative or
judicial processes and. . . may result in antitrust violations. '"2 The
Court gave as examples of such activities fraudulent procurement
of a patent, conspiracy with a licensing authority, and bribery of a
public purchasing agent. By analogy to these transgressions, the
Court suggested that a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims that
barred a competitor's access to an administrative agency or court
would constitute an abuse of the adjudicatory process actionable
under the Sherman Act."6
The Court's most recent reference to the Noerr-Pennington
immunity came in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States." In that
case the government alleged that the defendant public utility com-
pany attempted to retain its monopoly by filing a series of lawsuits
in order to prevent several municipalities, which formerly had pur-
chased electrical power from the utility at retail, from establishing
their own retail electrical systems. Although the utility eventually
lost all the litigation that it initiated, the pendency of the suits
interfered with the municipalities' efforts to market revenue bonds
to raise money for their systems.28 The district court, in a decision
filed prior to the Supreme Court's disposition of Trucking
Unlimited, found that the utility's conduct was subject to antitrust
scrutiny because the trial court believed that Noerr did not insulate
25. Id. at 513.
26. Although the Court's opinion specifically referred to the "access-barring" and "in-
discriminate opposition" language of the complaint, the Court noted:
More critical are other allegations, which are too lengthy to quote, and which elaborate
on the "sham" theory by stating that the power, strategy, and resources of the petition-
ers were used to harass and deter respondents in their use of administrative. . . proceed-
ings ....
Id. at 511. Ostensibly, this is a reference to the joint-funding arrangement and to the threats
that defendants communicated to plaintiffs. The Court did not state expressly, however,
whether these additional acts formed a necessary part of the antitrust offense or whether the
repeated, indiscriminate opposition by itself was actionable. In his opinion concurring in the
result Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, rejected the Court's analogy between such
clearly illegal acts as bribery and fraud on the one hand and a pattern of baseless claims on
the other. Because the first amendment protects even unfounded invocations of the adjudica-
tory process, the concurring justices argued, the defendants ran afoul of the antitrust laws
not because of the manner in which they invoked the adjudicatory process but rather because,
taken as a whole, their conduct evidenced the absence of a "genuine intent" to influence
governmental action and thus fell within the Noerr sham exception. Id. at 517-18 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
27. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
28. The trial court explained that a "'no-litigation certificate,' reflecting the absence
of litigation which might impair the salability of revenue bonds, is essential to a successful
sale of municipal bonds." United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D.
Minn. 1971).
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the institution of litigation from antitrust penalties.29 The Supreme
Court, in light of its intervening decision in Trucking Unlimited,
remanded the case to the trial court for a consideration of the Noerr
immunity, as extended in Trucking Unlimited to the adjudicatory
setting and, correspondingly, for an examination of the "mere
sham" exception. The Court noted that in Trucking Unlimited it
had held that the principle of the Noerr sham exception "may also
apply to the use of administrative . . . processes where the purpose
to suppress competition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying
the hallmark of insubstantial claims .... ",30 The instant decision
represents a recent attempt to synthesize the holdings of Trucking
Unlimited and Otter Tail and to apply the "sham exception" in the
context of an alleged abuse of the adjudicatory process.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
For the purpose of assessing the propriety of the district court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' action, the instant court accepted plaintiffs'
characterization of the municipal board as an adjudicatory body
and of defendants' opposition before the board as "baseless." '3' Ex-
amining the specific language of the complaint, the court found no
allegations of conduct amounting to a literal denial of "free and
unlimited access" to the board.3 2 The revocation of plaintiffs' per-
mits suggested to the court no more than that plaintiffs and defen-
dants had confronted one another before the board and that plain-
29. Id.
30. 410 U.S. at 380. On remand the trial judge made the following brief finding:
[Tihe repetitive use of litigation by Otter Tail was timed and designed principally to
prevent the establishment of municipal electric systems and thereby to preserve de-
fendant's monopoly . . . . [Tihe litigation comes within the sham exception to the
Noerr doctrine as defined by the Supreme Court in [Trucking Unlimited] ....
United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp. 451-52 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd mem., 417
U.S. 901 (1974). For a general discussion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine see Note, The
Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of the Antitrust and Constitutional Rami-
fications of Petitioning the Government, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 281 (1973).
31. Referring to § 3.651 of the San Francisco City Charter, see note 4 supra, the court
questioned whether the Board properly could be deemed an adjudicatory body in light of the
"extremely broad standards governing the exercise of that body's discretion." 542 F.2d at
1079. Since the court felt that the board was actually a "political . . . body," it further
questioned whether any opposition instituted before such a body could be called "baseless."
The relatively precise legal standards in light of which certain arguments may be charac-
terized as "frivolous" are simply absent from the rough and tumble of the political arena;
almost any position, including the self-interested plea of one competitor that another
should be denied a permit, may be urged before such a political body.
Id.
32. "Nowhere in the complaint does McDonald's tell us, specifically, how or why or
even whether the defendants' alleged efforts to influence the Board have in any way impaired
McDonald's ability fully to present its views to the Board." Id.
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tiffs had lost.3 Defendants' own rights to appear before the board,
even for anticompetitive purposes, the court noted, were protected
by the immunity established in Noerr and extended to the adjudica-
tory process by Trucking Unlimited. The "sham exception" to that
immunity, as articulated in Noerr,3 was held inapposite because by
its express terms the Noerr exception applied only to publicity cam-
paigns, and because even if the Noerr exception did apply to direct
petitioning efforts the exception could be invoked only in the ab-
sence of a genuine effort to influence a governmental body. In the
instant case, the court asserted there was no doubt that defendants
sought and obtained official action."5 The court then decided that
the "sham exception" in Trucking Unlimited was equally inapplica-
ble. Although McDonald's complaint echoed the "access-barring"
language of Trucking Unlimited, the instant court held that the
denial of access in that case was achieved by threats of massive,
jointly funded opposition that was intended to discourage the plain-
tiffs in Trucking Unlimited from invoking the adjudicatory process
in the first place. The instant court found that the conduct alleged
in McDonald's complaint had no such deterrent effect.35 The court
acknowledged the general proposition of Trucking Unlimited that
the right to petition an administrative agency or court, although
protected by the first amendment, does not confer absolute anti-
trust immunity on the petitioner regardless of the manner in which
he invokes the process.37 In light of the specific facts of Trucking
Unlimited, however, the instant court reasoned that "this qualifica-
tion means no more than that defendants who engage in Noerr-
protected lobbying [or petitioning] activities may nevertheless
subject themselves to antitrust liability if they engaged in activities
33. Id.
34. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
35. 542 F.2d at 1081. The court commented in a footnote that McDonald's might have
a remedy in state court if the Board acted improperly, but the court knew of "no case that
holds that joint action which succeeds in persuading a public body to make an erroneous
decision can give rise to a cause of action under the Sherman Act." Id. at 1079 n.2.
36. The court elaborated:
There is no allegation that defendants have conducted a publicity campaign, no allega-
tion that their efforts are jointly financed, and, most importantly, no allegation that
defendants have by communicating threats sought to deter McDonald's from filing
permit applications. The only facts relied on to support the otherwise wholly conclusory
access-barring allegation are the appearances of defendants' members . . . before the
Board and the threats to withdraw political support, on three occasions. Both of these
activities are clearly within the direct lobbying immunity recognized by Noerr,
Pennington and Trucking Unlimited itself.
Id. at 1081.
37. See notes 25 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
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external to or abusive of the . . administrative or judicial process,
which activities, like the threats of opposition in Trucking Unlim-
ited, tend to 'harass and deter . . . competitors from having "free
and unlimited access" to [appropriate] agencies.' "38 Since in the
court's view McDonald's had alleged only that their access to the
municipal board had been limited by defendant's bad faith (but
Noerr-protected) efforts to influence the board and had alleged no
specific acts external to or abusive of the adjudicatory process, the
court held that McDonald's complaint failed to state a cause of
action under section 1 of the Sherman Act.39
The dissenting opinion charged the majority with having mis-
read Trucking Unlimited and Otter Tail. According to the dissent,
the gravamen of Trucking Unlimited was that a pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims may in and of itself constitute a Sherman Act
offense" when such a pattern evidences an intent to inflict competi-
tive injury by barring competitors from "meaningful access" to ad-
judicatory proceedings. Under the dissenting opinion's reading of
Trucking Unlimited, conduct in addition to the groundless invoca-
tion of the adjudicatory process, such as threats, need not be al-
38. 542 F.2d at 1081-82 n.4. Similarly in Otter Tail, the court argued, it was the use of
threats of dilatory litigation that caused the loss of Noerr immunity, not the bare fact that
the defendant there brought a series of spurious lawsuits. Furthermore, the court noted, Otter
Tail Power Co. could achieve its anticompetitive purpose of retarding the sale of municipal
bonds simply by filing lawsuits, without regard to the final outcome of the litigation. By
contrast, the instant defendants could block only McDonald's efforts to build new restaurants
by successful invocation of the permit review process. This fact supported the court's earlier
conclusion that the defendants were engaged in a genuine effort to influence governmental
action.
39. The court conceded that under ordinary notice pleading rules, McDonald's com-
plaint would survive a motion to dismiss, and plaintiffs would be allowed to use discovery to
develop proof of the types of specific conduct the court felt were necessary to establish a denial
of "free and unlimited access" to the adjudicatory process. The court argued, however, that
holding plaintiffs' "conclusory access-barring incantation" sufficient to state a Sherman Act
cause of action might chill the exercise of first amendment rights. Although the court dis-
claimed any intent to require "fact pleading" in antitrust cases, the court held
that in any case, whether antitrust or something else, where a plaintiff seeks damages
or injunctive relief, or both, for conduct which is prima facie protected by the First
Amendment, the danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise of
First Amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be
required.
542 F.2d at 1082-83. A full discussion and analysis of the rationale underlying this procedural
aspect of the instant opinion is beyond the scope of this comment. It is sufficient for present
purposes to note the court's marked solicitude for first amendment values.
40. If there were any doubt as to the majority's meaning in Trucking Unlimited,
it would be dispelled by the opinion of Justice Stewart [see note 26 supral who . ..
declined to join the majority opinion specifically because the majority held that Sher-
man Act liability may be based upon the manner in which defendants exercise their First
Amendment right of access to an adjudicatory tribunal.
542 F.2d at 1087.
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leged. In support of this conclusion the dissent cited the Otter Tail
language that summarized the "sham exception" solely in terms of
baseless, repeated claims and that made no mention of threats or
other conduct.4
IV. COMMENT
The instant decision is based on a very narrow reading of
Trucking Unlimited and Otter Tail and severely limits, at least in
the Ninth Circuit, the development of the Noerr "sham exception"
in the context of the adjudicatory process. The court perhaps was
correct in its observation that both Trucking Unlimited and Otter
Tail dealt with factual situations significantly different from that
in the instant case and that the holdings in those cases, viewed in
the light of their unique facts, did not provide direct authority for
allowing McDonald's complaint to stand. By contrast, however, as
the dissenting opinion noted, the language of Trucking Unlimited
and Otter Tail, when divorced from the specific facts in those cases
and read as general statements of law, is broad enough to cover the
conduct alleged in McDonald's pleadings.4 2 Several factors, as dis-
cussed below, suggest that the instant court's avoidance of the more
expansive language of the Trucking Unlimited and Otter Tail
holdings as a means of circumscribing the Noerr "sham exception"
was unjustified.
In discussing the Noerr "sham exception," Trucking Unlimited
emphasized that "misconduct" in the context of administrative or
judicial proceedings cannot enjoy antitrust immunity under the
guise of "political expression" protected by the first amendment. '3
If, as the instant court suggested, the essence of the Sherman Act
offense in Trucking Unlimited was conduct external to the adjudica-
tory process"4-the defendants' open threats of continual opposition
and the joint-funding arrangement-the Trucking Unlimited court
would not have had to carve out a "sham exception." By definition,
conduct external to the adjudicatory process does not enjoy Noerr
immunity. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Court would
have refused to impose antitrust liability if the Trucking Unlimited
defendants had refrained from communicating any threats of their
41. See text accompanying note 30 supra. The dissenting opinion noted that on remand
the district court's finding mentioned only defendant's repetitive use of litigation.
42. Compare, for example, the broad statement in Otter Tail, see text accompanying
note 30 supra, cited by the dissenting opinion, with the instant majority's reading of Trucking
Unlimited, which integrated both facts and holding, see text accompanying note 38 supra.
43. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
44. See notes 37 & 38 supra and accompanying text.
19771
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intended opposition, confident instead that plaintiffs would soon
discover the scheme by empirical observation, or if defendants had
financed their opposition on an individual basis rather than via a
joint-funding arrangement. More plausible is the conclusion that
the "misconduct" that caused the defendants in Trucking Unlim-
ited to lose Noerr immunity was the pattern of indiscriminate, re-
petitious claims that in and of itself was sufficient to deter and
harass the plaintiffs from having meaningful access to the adjudica-
tory process. The threats and the joint funding were significant only
because they lent additional credibility to the plaintiffs' claims that
the pattern of opposition was indiscriminate and conducted for anti-
competitive purposes." The instant plaintiffs have in a sense stated
a stronger case: whereas the plaintiffs in Trucking Unlimited
alleged opposition with or without probable cause,4" McDonald's
alleged that the instant defendants' opposition was entirely
unfounded and conducted solely to frustrate plaintiffs as competi-
tors.47
Although the preceding analysis represents only one possible
interpretation of the significance of Trucking Unlimited and Otter
Tail, sound policy reasons support construction in McDonald's
favor of any ambiguities in those Supreme Court decisions. The
instant court's reluctance to uphold McDonald's complaint is due
in part to the conviction, derived from Noerr, that the Sherman Act
was intended to regulate "business activity" and not "political ac-
tivity."4" Not only does Trucking Unlimited reject the notion that
"misconduct" in the adjudicatory setting properly can be character-
ized as Noerr-protected "political activity," 9 but also the current
pervasiveness of governmental regulation of business makes ques-
tionable the continued vitality of Noerr's neat distinction between
government and business. The instant court's condonation of base-
less opposition before a regulatory body creates a significant and
unnecessary loophole in the antitrust laws. The court's suggestion
that McDonald's may have a remedy in state court if the board
improperly denied their permits does not explain adequately why
they cannot also maintain an antitrust action against defendants for
45. The immateriality of the presence of threats to the holding of Trucking Unlimited
is supported by the absence of mention in any of the Otter Tail opinions of conduct other
than the simple filing of lawsuits.
46. See note 19 supra.
47. The fact that the Board was swayed by defendants' arguments should create no
more than a rebuttable presumption that the opposition was meritorious.
48. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
49. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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inducing those erroneous decisions. Certainly the antitrust laws
were not designed to permit review of every administrative or judi-
cial ruling that has an anticompetitive effect on the losing party.
Nevertheless, the Sherman Act ought to be broad enough to impose
sanctions on groups of business interests who pool their resources
and ingenuity for the purpose of playing repeatedly upon the falli-
bility of adjudicatory tribunals in order to induce decisions that
have severe anticompetitive impact and that can be shown in a
separate antitrust action to be wholly without merit.
Finally, the instant court argued that allowing the joint spon-
sorship of a pattern of baseless litigation to constitute an antitrust
violation would have a chilling effect on the valid exercise of the first
amendment right to petition? ° This hypothesis is difficult to refute.
It is submitted, however, that in the adjudicatory setting standards
for determining whether opposition is "frivolous" are fashioned
much more easily than are criteria for measuring the validity of
proposals urged before legislative bodies." Furthermore, a rigid
standard of proof for establishing the baselessness of a competitor's
repeated opposition would ensure that potential plaintiffs use con-
siderable discretion in bringing a cause of action under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
SAMUEL E. STUMPF, JR.
Constitutional Law-First
Amendment-Student's Right to Receive
Information Precludes Board's Removal of
Allegedly Offensive Books from High School
Library
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff high school students' brought a class action2 seeking
50. See note 39 supra.
51. The instant court itself recognized the greater precision with which "baseless"
arguments could be identified in the adjudicatory setting. See note 31 supra.
1. Plaintiffs were enrolled in schools of the Strongsville City School System.
2. Subject matter jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
1977]
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declaratory and injunctive relief to compel defendant school offi-
cials3 to return books4 removed from the school library' because
defendants found the content of the books objectionable.6 Plaintiffs
claimed that removal of the books solely because their content of-
fended defendants' personal tastes violated 42 U.S.C. § 19837 and
the first and fourteenth amendments." On motion to dismiss, defen-
dants contended that plaintiffs' first amendment rights did not re-
strict the school board's power to censor the school library and to
remove books with subject matter distasteful to board members.'
The district court dismissed the complaint. 0 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, reversed. Be-
cause the first amendment guarantees a student's right to receive
information, it precludes removal of books from a public school
library on the sole ground that school officials find the content of
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens ....
3. Defendants were the Strongsville City School District, the members of the Board of
Education, and the Superintendent of the school district.
4. At a special meeting of the Strongsville School Board on August 19, 1972, the follow-
ing motion was made and carried:
Dr. Cain moved, seconded by Mr. Henzey, that the textbook entitled Cat's Cradle not
be used any longer as a text or in the library in the Strongsville schools.
Similarly, at a meeting of the Board on August 31, 1972, the following action was recorded
in the minutes:
Mrs. Wong moved, seconded by Dr. Cain, that the textbook Catch 22 be removed from
the library in the Strongsville schools.
5. The Board's order regarding removal of the books was made pursuant to the author-
ity granted by 33 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3329.07 (Page 1972), which provides:
The board of education of each city, exempted village, and local school district shall
cause it to be ascertained and at a regular meeting determine which, and the number of
each of the textbooks the schools under its charge require.
6. The complaint also alleged that the Board's action in refusing to approve Joseph
Heller's Catch 22 and Kurt Vonnegut's God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater as texts or library
books and its resolution prohibiting teacher and student discussion of the books denied
plaintiffs their right to learn freely and thereby constituted a prior restraint on freedom of
speech secured by the first and fourteenth amendments.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or any other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
8. The first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom
of speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The fourteenth amendment makes this proscription applica-
ble to the states. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
9. A motion to intervene as defendants was made on behalf of other students in the high
school by their parents, indicating that plaintiffs' requested relief was not compatible with
the wishes and interests of all high school students in the Strongsville System.
10. 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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the books objectionable. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School
District, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
IX. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Throughout the history of federal court adjudication of first
amendment cases, jurists have recognized that the reciprocal char-
acter of communication provides the basis for a right to hear as well
as a right to speak." It was not until the 1960's, however, that the
federal courts focused on the juxtaposition between freedom of ex-
pression and the interest in receiving information, either directly
from a source whose speech is constitutionally protected, or
indirectly through books and other publications.'2 Lamont v. Post-
master Genera 1,'3 the first significant case bearing upon the nature
of a constitutional right to receive information, examined the valid-
ity of a federal statute'4 requiring addressees to fill out a form reply
card before receiving printed material from Communist countries.
Plaintiffs'5 asserted a constitutional right to receive such mail un-
impeded by the disclosure of their identity assured by the reply
cards. A unanimous Supreme Court'" invalidated the statute "be-
cause it require[d] an official act . . . as a limitation on the unfet-
tered exercise of the addressee's First Amendment rights.' 7 The
opinion said little about the nature of the underlying constitutional
interest.' 8 A concurring opinion by Justice Brennan, however, did
11. E.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). For an early discussion
bearing on the constitutional right to receive information and ideas, see Meiklejohn, Freedom
to Hear and to Judge, 10 LAW. GuiLD REV. 26 (1950).
12. There is scant, though respectable, authority supporting the idea that the framers
of the first amendment meant to protect both ends of the communication process. James
Madison, chairman of the committee that drafted the first amendment, said of the relation-
ship between information and responsible citizenship:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own Gover-
nors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. A popular govern-
ment without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a
farce or tragedy, or, perhaps both. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4,
1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (emphasis supplied).
See also O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 209, 220-
22 (1973).
13. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
14. Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-793, § 305(a), 76 Stat. 840.
15. Failure of the addressee to return a signed card for each piece of "communist
political propaganda" would result in the eventual destruction of the material. Plaintiffs were
addressees wishing to receive communist publications through the United States mails.
16. Justice Douglas authored the opinion of the Court.
17. 381 U.S. at 305.
18. Some commentators give a broad reading to Lamont, despite the cryptic quality of
the opinion: "The case is also interesting, it should be noted, as protecting the right to receive,
as distinct from sending, communications." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
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develop more fully the relevant constitutional claim:
[Tihe protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to
protect from congressional abridgement those equally fundamental personal
rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful. . .. I think
the right to receive publications is such a fundamental right. The dissemina-
tion of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free
to receive and consider them."
Subsequent cases involving bans on speakers at state college
and university campuses2 focused more directly on the substantial
infringement on the interests of both speaker and listener imposed
by governmental censorship. Snyder v. Board of Trustees2' is typical
of lower federal court reaction to student claims predicated on a first
amendment interest in the receipt of information and ideas. In
Snyder a federal district court declared unconstitutional an Illinois
statute denying access to university facilities to "any subversive,
seditious, and un-American organization" 2 in response to student
claims that the challenged law denied them access to speakers they
wished to hear in violation of the first amendment. 23 Relying on
Justice Brennan's opinion in Lamont, 4 the Court held that "a First
Amendment right to peacefully assemble to listen to the speaker of
one's choice. . . may not be impaired by state legislation any more
than the right of the speaker may be impaired."25
The trend in the lower federal courts to afford first amendment
EXPRESSION 593-626 (1970). For a narrower reading, see O'Neil, supra note 12, at 219, where
Professor O'Neil concludes that the Court never really held that the addressee has a constitu-
tional right to receive particular material through the mails: "It held only that Congress could
not require the addressee, as a condition of receiving such material, to disclose on a separate
post card his desire to receive each piece of suspect mail. . . .It was the condition. . and
not the restriction, that was unconstitutional." Such a construction of Lamont would assimi-
late it into the body of law dealing with unconstitutional conditions on government benefits.
The notion behind the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is that government power to
deny a benefit outright does not necessarily imply a power to condition access to that benefit
upon the surrender of other liberties. See generally O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions:
Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443, 474 (1966); Note, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
19. 381 U.S. at 308.
20. E.g., Brooks v. Auburn University, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Univer-
sity of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). See generally Pollitt, Campus Censor-
ship: Statute Barring Speakers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REV. 179
(1963); Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963).
21. 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 144, § 48.8 (1964).
23. The dispute resulted from the refusal of university officials to allow Louis Deskin,
a member of the Communist Party of the United States, to speak on such topics as
"Communism and Youth" and "The Communist Party Platform" at campus meetings.
24. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
25. 286 F. Supp. at 932.
19771 RECENT CASES
protection for a right to receive information gained impetus in the
1972 Supreme Court decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel.2" In Mandel
a Marxist writer" challenged the denial of his entry into the United
States under the Immigration and Nationality Act, which barred
from entry persons who publish or advocate "the economic, interna-
tional, and governmental doctrines of World communism. 28 Plain-
tiff claimed that his exclusion violated both his own personal right
of entry and the first amendment rights of American scholars to
whom he had been invited to speak.29 While the majority found
plaintiff's claims overridden by the federal government's plenary
power of exclusion, 3 they acknowledged that first amendment is-
sues were presented by the scholars' invitation to Mandel. Despite
the disposition of the case, the Court did strengthen the constitu-
tional underpinnings of a right to receive information. Justice
Blackmun noted that the Court had referred to a first amendment
right to "receive information and ideas" in a variety of contexts.3'
The Court stated specifically that the right was particularly signi-
ficant in the academic community. 32
Any doubt regarding the status of the right to receive informa-
tion33 was resolved by the recent Supreme Court decision in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council,
Inc.31 Users of prescription drugs contended that a Virginia stat-
ute3 prohibiting pharmacists from advertising drug prices violated
26. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
27. Ernest Mandel was a Belgian Marxist writer and theorist.
28. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(28)(D), (G)(v), (d)(3)(A) (1970).
29. The lower court ruled that Mandel, as an alien, had no personal right of entry that
Congress could not restrict or abolish. It went on, however, to hold that citizens of the United
States did have a first amendment right to hear Mandel speak, and on that basis enjoined
enforcement of the statute. Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. 408 U.S. at 765-66.
31. Id. at 762.
32. The Court cited loyalty oath cases and other decisions involving academic freedom.
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
33. Prior to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), it was arguable that the first amendment protected only the speaker
or writer because the framers did not specifically safeguard the interests of listeners or read-
ers. Proponents of this argument claimed that the very force of the Bill of Rights as a
guarantor of free expression obviated the need to safeguard freedom of reception. O'Neil,
supra note 12, at 217.
34. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
35. Plaintiffs were Virginia residents who were required to take prescription drugs on a
daily basis, and two non-profit organizations, the Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc.,
and the Virginia State AFL-CIO, each having substantial membership of prescription drug
users.
36. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (Supp. 1974) provides:
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plaintiffs' first amendment right to receive information that phar-
macists wished to communicate to them through advertising. Rely-
ing primarily on Mandel, the Court noted that "where a speaker
exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communi-
cation, to its source and to its recipients both" 37 and held that "[ilf
there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the
advertising."38
Since, as the language in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
suggests, the scope of the right to receive information is coextensive
with the right to communicate,39 the protection afforded the right
to receive information in a particular context must be examined in
light of first amendment guarantees extended to freedom of expres-
sion. In the educational context, therefore, teacher assertions of a
first amendment right to teach are relevant in determining the
scope of the first amendment right to receive information in the
public school classroom. 0 Determinations of the extent of such
Any pharmacist shall be guilty of unprofessional conduct who...
(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever,
any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate, or credit terms for professional
services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only
by a prescription.
37. 425 U.S. at 756. In dictum, the Court mentioned other contexts in which a right to
receive information had been acknowledged. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974) (suggesting right of addressee to receive uncensored mail from prisoners); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (the interest of the listener in receiving fair
and balanced material through the broadcast media); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(right to possess and read in private material that might be legally obscene).
38. 425 U.S. at 757.
39. Id.
40. The classroom setting, particularly at the secondary and primary levels, is unique.
Traditional educational precepts define the function of lower-level education as the
inculcation of certain ideas, skills, knowledge, and information essential to society. This
"cultural transmission," or "prescriptive," approach refuses to apply the marketplace of
ideas model, on which the first amendment is grounded, to the public school classroom. See
Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What
They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1350-55 (1976). In recent years, however, the value
inculcation model has drawn fire from certain factions within the academic community. An
increasing number of educators have come to condemn the role of public schools as conduits
for indoctrination of community values. These "progressives" see as the function of education
the stimulation of intellectual creativity through a robust exchange of ideas. The classroom
thus becomes an intellectual "marketplace" where the first amendment imposes at least
minimal restrictions on government control. The marketplace model as yet has found little
favor in the courts. The outcome of any particular case involving the application of first
amendment rights is still in large part dependent upon which educational philosophy most
appeals to a majority of the court. See Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The
Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1176, 1180-82 (1973). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, a majority of the Court seemed to adopt the
progressive view of education in proscribing school efforts to censor extracurricular student
speech (the wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War). The Supreme Court,
however, has not been asked to apply the same philosophy in a case involving classroom
expression that affects school curriculum.
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rights necessarily entail analysis of a teacher's authority to deter-
mine methods of instruction contrary to the wishes of school author-
ities. " In Keefe v. Geanakos,4" the First Circuit considered a high
school teacher's suit to enjoin his discharge for discussing a "vulgar"
word'13 that appeared frequently in an article assigned for class dis-
cussion. Although acknowledging that some public regulation of
conduct inheres in every provision of lower level public education,
the court granted a preliminary injunction concluding that plaintiff
would probably prevail on the merits.4 Since plaintiff's use of the
word served a demonstrated educational function,45 his right to
teach outweighed the state's interest in exercising absolute control
over classroom teaching methods. 6
41. The modern doctrine of academic freedom usually refers to the concept that a
university faculty member is free to teach and a college student is free to learn whatever he
or she thinks best under the first amendment with only the most minimal restraints by
university authorities or government agencies. At the elementary and secondary levels, how-
ever, there is no strong tradition of intellectual freedom as in the college and university
setting. As a consequence, many educators conclude that the judicial doctrine of academic
freedom is not applicable to the public high school teacher or student. In support of this
notion is the argument that students in public schools are at an impressionable age where
exposure to controversial ideas would be detrimental. See note 40 supra. Professor Goldstein
argues that neither sound constitutional analysis nor authoritative precedent supports a
federal constitutional right of teachers to determine what they teach contrary to the desires
of school authorities. According to Goldstein, the freedom of expression rationale is inapplica-
ble to the high school setting since it is premised on an analytical model that views the
classroom as a marketplace of ideas. Goldstein, supra note 40, at 1351-55. Professor Nahmod,
on the other hand, proposes that the Constitution requires the adoption of the marketplace
of ideas model in public education:
It is true that Lamont and the cases on controversial campus speakers involve adults
or college students who are generally more mature than high school students. Moreover,
a high school classroom would seem to be a more controlled and restricted marketplace
of ideas than the mail or college campuses, if only because of compulsory attendance
and, frequently, a uniformly required curriculum. Nevertheless . . . it is clear that
students cannot be insulated from controversial subjects in school. If this applies to
student expression through worn symbols [and] underground newspapers, . . . then it
would seem both inconsistent and educationally unworkable to prohibit student access
to controversial subjects through supervised classroom presentations.
Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1055 (1971).
42. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
43. Plaintiff gave each member of his senior English class a copy of the September,
1969, Atlantic Monthly magazine, and assigned the first article therein. In the course of
discussion plaintiff explained the origin of the word "motherfucker," its context, and the
reasons the author had included it. The teacher defended his discussion of the word as
important to the development of the thesis and conclusions of the article.
44. The court also expressed concern for the chilling effect that might result from "such
rigorous censorship." 418 F.2d at 362.
45. In determining whether discussion of the article served an educational function, the
court read the article and made its own judgment as to its appropriateness in a high school
classroom, without benefit of any expert testimony.
46. The court held alternatively that plaintiff probably had not received constitution-
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The protection afforded a right to teach was expanded in
Parducci v. Rutland,47 an action to enjoin a high school teacher's
discharge for assigning allegedly offensive reading material to her
English class. 8 Upholding plaintiff's contention that her dismissal
violated her first amendment "right to academic freedom," the
court noted that teachers' entitlement "to First Amendment free-
doms is an issue no longer in dispute. ' 49 The court observed that,
although academic freedom is not an enumerated first amendment
right, a fundamental right to teach inheres in the view of the class-
room as a marketplace of ideas."
Other courts have been less willing to recognize a first amend-
ment right to teach sufficient to outweigh a governmental interest
in regulating the content of classroom discussion. For example, in
Mailloux v. Kiley,5 a high school teacher challenged his dismissal
for writing the word "fuck" on the blackboard to illustrate the con-
cept of taboo words.52 Initially, the district court, regarding itself as
bound by the First Circuit's opinion in Keefe, granted a preliminary
injunction.5 3 On the merits, however, the court concluded that Mail-
loux's use of a teaching method that was not approved by the weight
of opinion54 in the teaching profession and that was merely relevant
ally adequate notice that his conduct was forbidden. 418 F.2d at 362.
47. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
48. The teacher assigned Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s Welcome to the Monkey House, which
school authorities described as "literary garbage."
49. 316 F. Supp. at 354.
50. The court referred to Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 512 (1969), in which the Supreme Court stated:
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools. The classroom is pecularily the "marketplace of ideas."
But see Goldstein, supra note 40, at 1351-55, in which he notes that Tinker did not involve
student expression in the classroom context. According to Goldstein, the language in Tinker
describing the high school classroom as a marketplace of ideas is gratuitous.
51. 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir.), after dismissal, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd per
curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
52. The teacher had led a class discussion of A Thread that Runs so True, a novel that
described the difficulties encountered by a schoolteacher who attempted to intermingle the
previously segregated seating of boys and girls. During the discussion, a number of students
expressed opinions that parental protests against seating were ridiculous. Mailloux stated
that modern prejudices were just as ridiculous and attempted to illustrate his point by the
discussion of taboo words. Neither the subject of taboo words nor the word "fuck" appeared
in the novel being discussed.
53. 323 F. Supp. at 1389.
54. The court concluded that on the basis of the expert testimony it could not state that
the weight of opinion in the teaching profession as a whole or the weight of opinion among
English teachers would support Mailloux's conduct. Nor could the court determine on its own
that the teaching plainly served a demonstrated educational purpose. Id. at 1390. Neverthe-
less, the court invalidated the school board's action on the ground that Mailloux had not been
afforded adequate procedural protection. The court's arguments for refusing to extend the
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to his subject "5 did not come within its interpretation of the substan-
tive right to academic freedom upheld in Keefe and Parducci. Nor
would the court extend the right to teach to methods designed
merely to expose students to a variety of ideas, but restricted the
right to those cases in which the educational purpose clearly had
been demonstrated.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has refused to recognize the broad right to teach articulated
in Parducci and Keefe. In President's Council v. Community School
Board," plaintiff parents, teachers, librarian, and students chal-
lenged a New York City Community School Board's removal of
copies of Down These Mean Streets57 from all junior high school
libraries in the district." Unlike the Keefe, Parducci, and Mailloux
courts, the Second Circuit upheld the action of the school board
without discussing the value or harm of the book. Dismissing Keefe
and Parducci as not controlling since both involved dismissals with
concomitant issues of procedural due process not present here, " the
court noted that "[t]o the extent these cases hold that first amend-
ment rights have been violated whenever a district court disagrees
with the judgment of school officials as to the propriety of material
assigned by a teacher," 0 they are erroneous. The court refused to
substantive right of Keefe and Parducci are as follows:
While secondary schools are not rigid disciplinary institutions, neither are they open
forums in which mature adults, already habituated to social restraints, exchange ideas
on a level of parity. Moreover, it cannot be accepted as a premise that the student is
voluntarily in the classroom and willing to be exposed to a teaching method which,
though reasonable, is not approved by school authorities or by the weight of professional
opinion.
Id. at 1392. These arguments indicate that the court was not willing to accept the progressive
philosophy employed by the Keefe and Parducci courts. See notes 40 & 41 supra.
55. In regard to Mailloux's conduct, the court stated that it was an undecided question
whether a teacher has a substantive constitutional right to use a teaching method that was
merely "relevant to his subject and his students and, in the opinion of experts of significant
standing, serves a serious educational purpose..." 323 F. Supp. at 1391.
56. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
57. The book in question is an autobiographical account by Piri Thomas of a Puerto
Rican youth growing up in New York City's Spanish Harlem. The book is replete with taboo
phrases and expressions; its dialogue seeks to capture the realities of life in Spanish Harlem
through the eyes and earg of a resident. Some parents objected to the library's stocking the
book, which they claimed would have an adverse moral and psychological effect on their
children. As a response to these complaints, the board ordered the books removed from the
library.
58. Classroom discussion of the problems of Spanish Harlem was not prohibited by the
board's order.
59. 457 F.2d at 294.
60. Id. at 293-94.
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consider contentions that, in effect, the board was attempting to
censor classroom discussion by eliminating the book as an adjunct
to that discussion. Instead, the court defined the issue as requiring
a determination of what authority properly should select books or
curriculum and concluded that teachers had no constitutional right
to be the selectors." Thus prior to the instant case, no court had held
that removal of books from a public school library implicated either
a teacher's academic freedom to communicate or a student's recip-
rocal right to receive information.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court initially examined 2 the apparent Second Cir-
cuit pronouncement of school officials' absolute authority to remove
books from the library free from constitutional restraints. Empha-
sizing that the Second Circuit found such unbridled authority only
when "no showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or
thought" 3 was present, the court held that the instant case did
involve curtailment of first amendment interests since the school
board's only purpose in excising the books was to limit student
exposure to ideas the board found distasteful. 4 In considering
whether defendants' conduct in these circumstances violated plain-
tiffs' first amendment rights the court acknowledged that neither
61. The court noted:
The administration of any library, whether it be a university or particularly, a
public junior high school, involves a constant process of selection and winnowing based
not only on educational needs, but financial and architectural realities. To suggest that
the shelving and unshelving of books presents a constitutional issue, particularly where
there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or thought, is a proposition
we cannot accept.
Id. at 293.
62. Before turning to the question whether removal of the books violated plaintiffs' first
amendment rights, the court examined and rejected the claim that refusal to purchase certain
books recommended by a teachers' committee infringed upon freedom of expression:
Clearly, discretion as to the selection of textbooks must be lodged somewhere and
we can find no federal constitutional prohibition which prevents its being lodged in
school board officials who are elected representatives of the people. . . .In short, we
find no federal constitutional violation in this Board's exercise of curriculum and text-
book control as empowered by the Ohio statute.
541 F.2d at 579-80. The court also noted that there was no evidence in the record to show
that teachers and students were proscribed from discussing the subjects contained in the
books in the classroom. Id. at 584.
63. President's Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1972); see
note 61 supra.
64. The court noted that while the need for shelf space or wearing out of books might
require some selection of books to be disposed of, no such rationale was involved in this case.
The board's purpose, as the court discerned, was to "winnow" the library for books the
content of which occasioned their displeasure. 541 F.2d at 582.
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state nor school officials are required constitutionally to provide a
library for students and teachers."s Nevertheless, the court held
that, once the state had created the benefit, it could not impose
conditions on the exercise of the privilege without violating plain-
tiffs' first amendment interests. The board's action was analogized
to unconstitutionnal government attempts to constrain the commu-
nication of undesirable ideas, not by imposing outright restrictions
on the source or the recipients, but by imposing conditions on access
to the information.6 Thus, since eliminating the library as a source
for the books in question hindered plaintiffs' endeavors to acquire
the information contained therein 7 by imposing a serious burden on
classroom discussion of their content and ideas, the court concluded
that the first amendment protection afforded the students' "right
to know" precluded removal of the books for reasons related solely
to the political and social tastes of school board members.
IV. COMMENT
The instant case creates a split of authority at the circuit court
level by deciding that the first amendment prohibits state officials
from purging a public school library of books whose content they
find objectionable. The Second Circuit in President's Council was
unnecessarily insensitive to plaintiffs' first amendment claims, re-
garding the issue as merely what authority, teacher or school board,
has the responsibility of selecting books for a school library." The
court apparently based its decision on a different sort of case-a
school board's refusal to buy or shelve a particular book-and thus
did not deal directly with the case actually before it in which a book
already purchased and placed on the shelf was being recalled. The
distinction between the two cases, however, did not escape the in-
stant court. Although the claim of curtailment of freedom of expres-
sion was not couched in familiar first amendment terms, the court
quite properly recognized that removal of the books involved a state
attempt to chill classroom discussion by making unavailable a valu-
65. Justice Edwards in a footnote added:
On the other hand, it would be consistent with the First Amendment (although not
required by it) for every library in America to contain enough books so that every citizen
in the community could find at least some which he or she regarded as objectionable in
either subject matter, expression or idea.
Id. at 582 n.l.
66. See note 18 supra.
67. The court referred to the library as "a mighty resource in the free marketplace of
ideas," and noted that it "is specially dedicated to broad dissemination of ideas." 541 F.2d
at 582-83.
68. See text accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra.
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able tool through which a teacher might convey particular informa-
tion and ideas. In holding that the board's order removing the books
violated the first amendment by imposing a serious burden on the
students' acquisition of information and ideas, the instant decision
expands the constitutional protection afforded the right to receive
information to the public high school classroom."
Recognition of a first amendment right to receive information
in the public high school classroom necessarily encompasses the
concept of academic freedom adopted by the Keefe and Parducci
courts.70 By affording constitutional status to a student's right to
know, the instant court acknowledges that the first amendment
attaches to a teacher's classroom activity not merely for her own
benefit, but also to create in the classroom an intellectual market-
place of ideas. The marketplace model adopted by the court is akin
to that which exists in traditional public forums associated with the
educational process-the auditorium, the amphitheatre, the school
grounds-where the interest in allowing an interchange of diverse
ideas compels adoption of first amendment guarantees. While ap-
plication of the marketplace model to the high school classroom is
less obvious, and even highly controversial," the interest in estab-
lishing in the high school student 2 the raw materials with which to
question and probe accepted values and ideas is comparable to
those interests traditionally protected by the first amendment in
educational forums like the university classroom. The instant deci-
sion illustrates how a court embracing the progressive philosophy of
education may employ the first amendment to curtail state power
to monopolize classroom discussion under the guise of its authority
to make textbook selection.73 To a court adopting the prescriptive
view, any first amendment interest obviously is outweighed by the
state's interest in transmitting basic values, skills, and knowledge
69. See note 37 supra for other contexts in which a right to receive information has been
recognized.
70. See notes 46, 49 & 50 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 40 supra.
72. The high school classroom is perhaps more analogous to the university classroom
than it is to the classroom at the junior high or, particularly, the elementary level. Since high
school students arguably are less impressionable than children on the junior high level, the
state's interest in protecting children from exposure to certain ideas and concepts should
decrease in the context of higher level public education. This distinction may explain the
reluctance of the Second Circuit to impose the concept of academic freedom on the New York
City junior high school as contrasted with the willingness of the Keefe, Parducci and instant
courts to apply it on the secondary level.
73. The court thus rebuts the notion that Keefe and Parducci stand only for the proposi-
tion that a teacher cannot be fired for using a teaching method disapproved by his other
superiors without receiving appropriate notice and being afforded an opportunity to be heard.
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which, according to the Second Circuit, compels restraint of class-
room speech when the subject matter is disapproved by school offi-
cials.
The court might have avoided the philosophical controversy
inherent in a decision based on substantive first amendment rights
by focusing on the school board's deviation from its customary ad-
ministrative procedure for determining what books are maintained
in the school library. This process of selection involves not only a
choice as to additional books to be shelved, but also a determination
of whether a worn-out book will be replaced or whether a book will
be disposed of when shelf space becomes a problem. In either case
the selection method employed by the Strongsville School Board
and its ultimate decision are consistent with procedural due process.
A board committee meets with faculty and citizens to discuss re-
commended books prior to the board's final selection decision. 4
While there is no doubt as to the propriety and legality of vesting
in the school board this general power of selection when the selection
method is consistent with procedural due process guarantees, each
of the instances of removal in the present case involved a determina-
tion that an individual book, which when placed on the shelf impli-
cated first amendment procedural safeguards, would be removed
because of its content without any imput from those whose interests
would be affected. Like substantive rules themselves, such insensi-
tive selection procedures can chill freedom of expression. The mere
vote of a majority of the board, affording no realistic opportunity for
those affected to be heard,7 5 opens disquieting opportunities for the
school board to by-pass normal protective procedures designed to
safeguard the rights of students and teachers and thus transgresses
first amendment procedural guarantees. Framing the isssue as one
of first amendment due process would assimilate the instant deci-
sion into the burgeoning body of law which fastens strict procedural
requirements on government action aimed at controlling the exer-
74. The usual procedure was to appoint a board committee to make recommendations
on textbooks. It would meet with a faculty committee and a citizens' committee to discuss
the books recommended by the faculty before making its own recommendations to the full
Board.
75. Resolutions reflecting general school board policies of selection without regard to
specific books are usually legislative in nature, are subjected to limited review, and may only
be attacked on constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the other hand,
a determination that the status of a single book should be changed is usually a judicial
exercise. Those safeguards employed in adjudicatory proceedings should likewise be em-
ployed here. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprise, Inc., Civil No.74-1563 (6th Cir.,
decided June 21, 1976).
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cise of free expression76 and would avoid the controversy created by
predicating a claim on substantive first amendment protections.
The instant court, however, did address the substantive consti-
tutional implications of removal of existing texts from the library
shelf while avoiding the tangential and confusing issue of who is the
proper textbook selector. The decision would have been more help-
ful had the court articulated the reason for the different implica-
tions involved in refusal to purchase a book and removal of a book
from a library shelf. Obviously, both decisions can be related to
content and both may tend to chill classroom discussion of ideas
contained in the books. Selection of books to be shelved, however,
requires choosing from an infinite variety of books since no public
high school facility has the cataloguing staff, the space, or the
budget to carry more than a fraction of published works that might
be mentioned in class. Employing content as one of many criteria
in textbook selection is different from adopting content as the sole
basis for excising a particular book. The countervailing government
interests-scarce funds, limited personnel, and restricted space-
that outweigh the constitutional interests of students in a book
selection situation disappear when school officials remove a partic-
ular book merely because its content is offensive to their personal
tastes. The absence of these legitimate budgetary interests on the
part of the state tips the scales in favor of student rights, which
preclude state efforts to regulate protected expression under the
guise of its authority to make textbook selections.
M. CAROLYN BAREFIELD
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-
Federal Courts Are Bound by Federal
Wiretapping Statutes and Will Not Exclude
Evidence Seized by State Agents in Violation of
More Restrictive State Laws
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Defendant appealed her federal conviction for possession of her-
oin' on the ground that the trial court erred in denying her motion
76. See generally Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REV. 518
(1970).




to suppress evidence seized by California police in violation of state
law.2 Federal agents had procured information regarding a narcotics
sale3 through a wiretap authorized pursuant to Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.1 Although Califor-
nia law prohibits wiretapping and the use of its fruits in any way,5
this information was delivered to California state police and led to
the arrest of defendant and seizure of the evidence.6 Defendant con-
tended that evidence seized by state agents in the course of a search
conducted in violation of state wiretapping law is not admissible in
federal criminal proceedings even though the seizure may satisfy the
Constitution and federal statutory requirements.7 The government,
with whom the district court agreed, argued that federal courts
should apply federal standards when considering the admissibility
of evidence and should not be bound by more restrictive state stat-
utes. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en
banc, held, affirmed. Although state law may prohibit wiretapping
and state courts may exclude evidence obtained by such practices,
federal courts are not bound by the more restrictive state statutes
and may admit all evidence not seized in violation of the Constitu-
2. Defendant alleged that the arrest, search, and seizure were all fruits of an unlawful
wiretap. See note 7 infra and accompanying text.
3. Federal agents had learned through wiretaps that the target of their investigation,
James Kilpatrick Cooper, was planning to make a narcotics purchase and then drive from
Los Angeles to Fresno with a female companion, who turned out to be defendant.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970) provides for the interception
of oral and wire communications by federal agents. The court did not question the validity
of the wiretaps under federal law because that issue had been decided previously in United
States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 1970) provides in part:
(a) Prohibited acts; punishment; recidivists. Any person who . . . intentionally
taps, or makes any unauthorized connection. . . with any telegraph or telephone wire
.. . or who uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communi-
cate in any way, any information so obtained . . . is punishable by a fine . . . or by
imprisonment. . . or by both. ...
(c) Evidence. Except as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of this section,
no evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be admissible in any judicial...
proceeding.
6. State police, having received this information from the federal agents and acting
without a warrant, stopped Cooper's car in Fresno and asked the occupants to step out. One
of the officers detected an acetic odor emanating from defendant's purse, and a subsequent
search revealed narcotics paraphernalia and 51 grams of heroin. This evidence was introduced
at defendant's trial over her objection.
7. This argument was two-pronged: the actions of the state police should be judged on
the basis of the more restrictive state wiretapping law rather than on the provisions of Title
III, and alternatively, if federal law is applied, the court should extend the scope of the
exclusionary rule to cover evidence seized by state agents in violation of state law. This second
contention focused on the illegality of the wiretap under the state statute and argued that
state officials cannot use the fruits of such a wiretap regardless of federal standards.
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tion or applicable federal statutes. United States v. Hall, No. 73-
2826 (9th Cir., Aug. 31, 1976).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Weeks v. United States8 the Supreme Court first announced
that federal courts must exclude evidence obtained by federal offi-
cers in violation of the fourth amendment.' In that case, however,
the Court permitted federal courts to continue to admit evidence
unconstitutionally seized by state officers and turned over to federal
agents.'0 The Court subsequently narrowed the scope of this "silver
platter doctrine" in Lustig v. United States" by holding that when
the combined efforts of state and federal agents produce an uncon-
stitutional search and seizure, the fruits of that activity are subject
to the federal exclusionary rule. Finally, in Elkins v. United States, 2
the silver platter doctrine was struck down in its entirety. In Elkins
the Court declared that the doctrine is incompatible with fourth
amendment guarantees and undermines state and federal policies
of assuring obedience to the Constitution by law enforcement
officers.' 3 This policy concern was justified especially in those states
that already had adopted the exclusionary rule because their efforts
to exclude illegally seized evidence were being frustrated by the
admission of this evidence in federal proceedings.'4 Thus the Court
expressed a concern for both of the traditional justifications for the
exclusionary rule: the deterrent effect of the rule and the integrity
of the courts.' 5 The Court has been reluctant to extend the exclusion
of silver platter evidence to evidence seized by agents other than
state officers or to proceedings other than federal criminal trials.',
For instance, in United States v. Janis'7 the Court refused to exclude
evidence unlawfully seized by a state officer and then levied upon
8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
9. The fourth amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. 232 U.S. at 398.
11. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
12. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
13. Id. at 220-21.
14. Id. at 221. The Court found this frustration of the efforts of states that had
adopted the exclusionary rule to be "particularly inappropriate and ironic" since the federal
courts were impeding efforts by the states to assure compliance with the fourth amendment.
Id.
15. Id. at 221-22.
16. Note, The New International "Silver Platter" Doctrine: Admissibility in Federal
Courts of Evidence Illegally Obtained by Foreign Officers in a Foreign Country, 2 N.Y.U.J.
OF INT'L L. & POL. 280 (1969).
17. 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).
[Vol. 30:98
19771 RECENT CASES
by IRS officials for use in a civil tax proceeding. In reaching this
decision, the Court only briefly addressed the judicial integrity ra-
tionale 8 and then proceeded to find that the deterrence function
would not be furthered because of the lack of common interest be-
tween state criminal authorities and federal tax officials.'"
In discussing the exclusionary rule, the Elkins Court seemingly
attached much importance to the right of the states to establish and
promote their own sanctions,"0 but at the same time it declared that
federal standards should not be displaced by state law."1 One year
later the exclusionary rule itself was imposed upon the states in
Mapp v. Ohio.2 2 Although one of the goals of Mapp was to create
some degree of national uniformity, 3 the first Supreme Court case
to explain further the Mapp rule held that the decision did not
preclude the states from developing their own standards regarding
arrest, search, and seizure in order to meet "the practical demands
of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement. 21 4 Consis-
tent with this philosophy, California took steps toward eliminating
those kinds of searches that had prompted the imposition of the
exclusionary rule. On the subject of electronic surveillance, the Cali-
fornia Penal Code expressly prohibits interceptions of oral and wire
18. Id. at 3034 n.35.
19. Id. at 3034.
20. The Court stated that the "question with which we deal today affects not at all the
freedom of the states to develop and apply their own sanctions in their own way." 364 U.S.
at 221.
21. In closing, the majority stated:
In determining whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state
officers, a federal court must make an independent inquiry, whether or not there has
been an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how any such inquiry may have
turned out. The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state court may
have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed.
Id. at 223-24.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, recognized the potential conflict between state and fed-
eral practices and predicted that federal courts would disregard state rules when considering
whether to admit evidence seized by state officers. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
State law seeking to control improper methods of law enforcement is frustrated by the
Court's new rule whenever a State which enforces an exclusionary rule places restrictions
upon the conduct of its officers not directly required by the Fourth Amendment with
regard to federal officers. . . .I cannot think why the federal courts should thus encour-
age state illegalities.
Id. at 245-46. Frankfurter's prediction was in part supported by the Court's holding in a
companion case to Elkins that was remanded for an evaluation of the admissibility of evi-
dence seized by state agents on the basis of fourth amendment standards. Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
22. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). California had adopted the exclusionary rule 6 years before the
Mapp decision. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
23. 367 U.S. at 657-58.
24. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
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communications and excludes from evidence in any judicial pro-
ceeding the fruits of all such interceptions."
Congress, in response to pressure from the Supreme Court,"
enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 (Title III) in order to create uniform federal standards for
the regulation of electronic surveillance.2 7 Title III is not as restric-
tive as the California law, and it allows the interception of commu-
nications pursuant to legally authorized warrants. 2 Several sections
of Title III deal directly with state law enforcement officials and
state courts, and the legislation as a whole evinces an intent to foster
cooperation between federal and state officials .2 Title III provides
for the issuance of wiretap authorizations by state judges to certain
state officers "[I]n conformity with section 2518 . . . and with the
applicable State statute .... ",30 This provision has as its goal the
centralization of statewide policy in this area, but Congress envi-
sioned that the state would be permitted to enact more restrictive
provisions for the issuance of warrants'.3 Furthermore, Title III au-
thorizes the use and disclosure of information gathered by wiretaps
by any investigative or law enforcement officer 32 who by any means
authorized by Title III has obtained knowledge of such informa-
25. See note 5 supra. For a comparative study of the California and federal statutes see
Comment, Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in State Legislative Control, 57
CALIF. L. REv. 1182 (1969).
26. See Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), in which the Court struck down
the New York wiretap statute and outlined the requirements for a constitutional wiretap
statute; Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and
Order," 67 MICH. L. REV. 455, 457-77 (1969).
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-19 (1970).
29. The Senate Report on § 2517 provides:
The proposed provision envisions close Federal, State, and local cooperation in the
administration of justice. The utilization of an information-sharing system within the
law-enforcement community circumscribed by suitable safeguards for privacy is within
the intent of the proposed legislation.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1967, S.
REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1968) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1097].
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1970).
31. The Senate Report on § 2516(2) provides:
No applications [for electronic surveillance] may be authorized unless a specific
State statute permits it. The State statute must meet the minimum standards reflected
as a whole in the proposed chapter. The proposed provision envisions that States would
be free to adopt more restrictive legislation, or no legislation at all, but not less restrictive
legislation.
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 29, at 98.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) (1970) defines an investigative or law enforcement officer as
"[A]ny officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is
empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in
this chapter. .. ."
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tion.3 3 This power is limited, however, by the caveat that such use
or disclosure by an officer must be "appropriate to the proper per-
formance of his official duties. 34
The effect that the legislative scheme of Title III has had on
more restrictive state statutes such as that of California is not en-
tirely clear. The Supreme Court held in United States v. DiRe"5 that
because there was no relevant federal statute governing warrantless
arrests, the federal courts had to rely on the corresponding state
statutes .3 Since that time the Court has reaffirmed the right of the
states to impose higher standards in fourth amendment cases than
are required by the Constitution. 37 In cases in which there are ap-
plicable federal rules, however, federal courts have ruled consis-
tently since Olmstead v. United States" that when states do impose
higher standards, the actions of federal agents shall be judged on the
basis of federal law. 9 The Ninth Circuit relied on this principle in
deciding in United States v. Keen 0 that the propriety of a wiretap
conducted by federal officers should be determined by reference to
federal law even though the investigations violated the stricter state
wiretap laws. 1 When the evidence was illegally seized by state offi-
cers, however, the courts have not been as consistent in determining
its admissibility. Several circuits have ruled in cases involving the
validity of search warrants that when there clearly is no violation
by the state officer of the fourth amendment or federal law, more
restrictive state procedures will not compel exclusion of evidence by
federal courts.42 Two circuits have held in cases of telephone moni-
toring by local police that because no federal standards had been
violated, exclusion of the evidence in federal courts merely because
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1970) provides in part:
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this
chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire or oral communication or
evidence derived therefrom may use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate
to the proper performance of his official duties.
34.. Id.; S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 29, at 99-100.
35. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
36. Id. at 589; accord, Watson v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 820, 826 n.8 (1976). But see
United States v. Miller, 452 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
37. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
38. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
39. Id. at 468-69; see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 754-55 (1952).
40. 508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
41. Accord, United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 858 (1976).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Dudek, 530 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Bedford, 519 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Melancon, 462 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972); United States v. Sims, 450 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1971).
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state law would dictate such a result was not necessary.' : The Sec-
ond Circuit, on the other hand, has ruled in several instances that
state law is controlling on questions of the validity of search war-
rants and wiretaps employed by state agents.4 In United States v.
Tortorello,45 the court discussed the implications and constitution-
ality of Title III, but the validity of several features of the state-
authorized wiretap and its effect upon the admission of evidence
was judged on the basis of state law.
Several state courts have interpreted the provisions of Title III
as authorizing states to enact stricter wiretap statutes that will not
be preempted by federal law. The California Supreme Court held
in People v. Conklin46 that Congress did not intend Title III to
preempt the entire field of electronic surveillance, but rather that
the legislative intent was to permit states to establish their own
standards. Furthermore, the court found that the state wiretap stat-
ute did not conflict with Title III merely because each employed
different standards in order to accomplish the common purpose of
protecting and guaranteeing the privacy of oral and wire communi-
cations. 7 For a true conflict to exist, the state law must actually
impair the attainment of federal objectives and not merely differ by
the degree to which the respective laws seek to protect the right of
privacy. Thus states such as California have demonstrated both a
clear intent to enact more rigorous wiretap provisions than Congress
has seen fit to establish and a belief that such legislation has not
been preempted by federal law.49 If federal courts judge the actions
of state agents on the basis of federal law when state and federal
wiretapping laws are inconsistent, they could create a new variety
of silver platter evidence that would enable state agents to seize
43. United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051
(1976); United States v. Neville, 516 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1975).
44. See United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990
(1975); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936
(1974).
45. 480 F.2d 764, 777-78, 781-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
46. 12 Cal. 3d 259, 522 P.2d 1049, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241, appeal dismissed for want of
substantial federal question, 419 U.S. 1064 (1974).
47. Id. at 269-70, 522 P.2d at 1055-56, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
48. Id. See also People v. Howard, 55 Cal. App. 3d 373, 127 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1976); People
v. Carrington, 40 Cal. App. 3d 647, 115 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1974); People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App.
3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749, appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 414 U.S.
804 (1973); 14 SANTA CLR LAW. 159 (1973). But see People v. Mahoney, 47 Cal. App. 3d
699, 122 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1975).
49. Several other states are in agreement; see, e.g., State v. Farha, 218 Kan. 394, 544
P.2d 341 (1975); State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972); Commonwealth v. Vitello,
327 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1975); People v. Warner, 65 Mich. App. 267, 237 N.W.2d 284 (1975).
[Vol. 30:98
RECENT CASES
evidence in violation of state law and transfer it to federal agents
for use in federal prosecutions. The possibility of establishing such
a double standard for state agents is present in the instant case, and
it provides the federal court with the question whether to honor the
intention of the state to impose stricter standards upon its own law
enforcement officers than Title III requires.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court recognized that although the wiretaps were
authorized by federal law, California does not permit wiretapping
and its courts would have excluded the fruits of the search. The
court acknowledged that in many instances United States v. DiRe'0
compels federal courts to adopt state standards, but held the DiRe
doctrine inapposite on two independent grounds: Title III provided
the applicable federal statute that was not present in DiRe, and the
instant case, unlike DiRe, concerned the admissibility of evidence
rather than the quantity of evidence necessary to establish probable
cause.' Thus concluding that DiRe was not dispositive, the court
decided that the propriety of the search and seizure must be judged
by reference to the controlling federal law. In so deciding, the court
rejected defendant's contentions that the controlling federal statute
allowed preemption by state law or that it was inapplicable to the
instant case because the state agents had exceeded the scope of their
official duties in violation of Title 111.52 After noting that to the
extent federal and state law conflict, the Supremacy Clause 3 directs
it to adhere to federal law, the court stated that Congress would
have provided explicitly that Title II be preempted by more restric-
tive state law if it had so intended. Moreover, the court determined
that Title I did not adopt state law as the test of "proper perform-
ance of . . . official duties," but that federal courts should focus
upon the reasonableness of the dissemination of the information
gathered by the wiretaps. 4 The court was satisfied that the state
agents had acted reasonably in turning the evidence over to federal
agents for use in a federal prosecution because possession of heroin
is both a federal offense and a felony under state law, and the state
50. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
51. United States v. Hall, No. 73-2826, slip op. at 4, 6-8 (9th Cir., Aug. 31, 1976).
52. The defendant's argument was based on 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (1970). See notes 33 &
34 supra and accompanying text.
53. The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
54. United States v. Hall, No. 73-2826, slip op. at 7-8 (9th Cir., Aug. 31, 1976).
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officers did have reasonable cause to believe that defendant had
committed a felony. 5 The court thus concluded that the state
agents had performed their official duties properly and that the
provisions of Title III had not been violated.
Having freed itself from the restrictive state statute, the court
was left with the narrow question whether evidence seized by state
agents in violation of state law should be excluded from federal
proceedings on policy grounds. Relying on United States v. Keen,"5
the court decided that the trial court had not erred by admitting the
disputed evidence. The court recognized that Keen was concerned
solely with federal agents and was distinguishable from the instant
case. Nevertheless, it adopted the view expressed in Keen that "the
exclusionary rule is a remedy which is integrally bound up with
constitutional protections . . . and . . . [the court is] not necessar-
ily bound to extend it to evidence tainted under stated law."57 The
court concluded that as long as the actions of the state agents satis-
fied constitutional and federal statutory requirements, a violation
of state law does not render evidence inadmissible in a federal crimi-
nal proceeding."
The dissenting judges stated that the majority, by refusing to
extend the exclusionary rule, had endorsed the type of double stan-
dard for state agents struck down in Elkins.5" The dissent found that
the admission of evidence seized in violation of state law was as
serious a compromise of federal judicial integrity as would be a
ratification of a violation of the fourth amendment itself. By focus-
ing upon legislative intent,"0 the dissent concluded that Congress
had encouraged the states to enact their own wiretapping provisions
and that the Supremacy Clause was not operative since the Califor-
nia provisions actually furthered rather than conflicted with the
goals of Title III. Furthermore, the dissent felt that federal stan-
dards should not be controlling since the state police, by violating
state law, were no longer performing their official duties as required
by Title 1.I' The dissent thus concluded that the state wiretapping
statute was controlling and that Congress had not intended that the
55. Id.
56. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
57. United States v. Hall, No. 73-2826, slip op. at 8-9 (9th Cir., Aug. 31, 1976).
58. A concurring opinion did not reach the merits because it found defendant not to
have standing to object under Title I. The concurring judge found that defendant was not
an "aggrieved" party to the wiretap as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970).
59. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 29 & 31 supra.
61. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
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close federal-state cooperation solicited by Title III be transformed
into a federal power to "'conscript' into federal employ the officers
of unwilling states such as California. '6 2
IV. COMMENT
The instant case reflects two recent developments in the law of
search and seizure, but the court failed to place appropriate empha-
sis upon these developments in order to analyze fully the issues
presented by the case. The first development concerns the conflict
between federal and state law over the procedures that their respec-
tive law enforcement officers may follow in searching for and secur-
ing evidence and consists of a reversal of the conditions that
prompted the Elkins and Mapp decisions. In those cases the Su-
preme Court imposed the exclusionary rule on evidence seized by
state officers in violation of the fourth amendment because the
states had failed to enact their own sanctions. In the instant case,
however, the court was faced with the question whether procedures
and evidence not available to state agents at the state level should
be authorized in federal proceedings. Although the court recognized
this dichotomy between state and federal law, it did not address the
inconsistency presented by the ability of state agents to secure evi-
dence in a manner expressly forbidden by state law, and yet avoid
state sanctions63 by transferring the evidence to federal authorities
for use in federal proceedings. The second development is a trend
in the federal courts to refuse to extend the exclusionary rule or to
discuss the implications that a refusal to extend the rule may have
in terms of judicial integrity. As United States v. Janis" indicates,
the rationale of judicial integrity that formerly served as a justifica-
tion for the exclusionary rule has fallen into disfavor. 5 Presently,
the federal courts are concerned primarily with a deterrence ration-
ale," but even this feature did not appear in the court's analysis.
Instead the court relied on the general proposition that the exclu-
sionary rule is bound up with fourth amendment guarantees and
therefore should not be applied to violations of state law not rising
to constitutional proportions.
62. United States v. Hall, No. 73-2826, slip op. at 18 (9th Cir., Aug. 31, 1976).
63. Arguably, if the state did wish to enforce its wiretap ban against its police officers,
it could punish them through the criminal provisions of its penal code rather than rely on
the sanction of the exclusionary rule. See note 5 supra.
64. 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).
65. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
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The analysis adopted by the majority concealed the actual im-
portance of the two developments. As the dissent pointed out, much
of the majority's discussion of the DiRe doctrine was unnecessary
because Title III furnished the applicable federal statute that was
absent in DiRe. 7 The two major questions that were raised by the
defendant and should have been discussed by the court were
whether Congress intended that Title III preempt the entire field of
electronic surveillance, and whether the exclusionary rule should be
extended to encompass evidence seized by state agents in violation
of state law. A strong argument can be made that the legislative
history of Title III reveals an intention to incorporate state law as
far as state agents are concerned. 8 Thus, even though the court may
have been correct in asserting that the propriety of the wiretaps
should be judged on the basis of federal law, there remains the
possibility that the authors of the federal law contemplated that the
actions of state agents would still be governed by state provisions
as long as those provisions did not violate the federal law. Moreover,
the limitation that section 2517 places on the use and disclosure of
information gathered through electronic surveillance by state offi-
cers69 would seem to indicate that a state officer, in performing his
official duties, could only act within the constraints that his state
has erected for him. The majority defined this limitation not in
terms of state requirements, however, but in terms of general stan-
dards of probable cause and reasonable dissemination of the con-
tents of interceptions. Thus the court has provided state police with
a different set of official duties than they normally would have to
follow when bringing matters before state courts. The theory that
the scope of the exclusionary rule should not be extended is not
inconsistent with the language in Elkins70 and the line of cases be-
ginning with Olmstead v. United States71 that refused to apply state
standards to the actions of federal agents. 72 The court's reliance on
United States v. Keen73 in this analysis seems somewhat suspect,
however, because Keen reviewed the actions of federal agents only
and did not discuss the issue of the relationship between state
agents and federal courts presented by the instant case.74 In fact all
67. See notes 35 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
69. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
70. See note 21 supra.
71. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
72. See text accompanying notes 38 & 39 supra.
73. 508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
74. See notes 40 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
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of these decisions are distinguishable from the instant case because
they were directed to the actions of federal agents, and the policy
reasons for applying state law to state agents are not as compelling
when the actions of federal agents have been called into question.
Moreover, the policy grounds that supported the abandonment of
the silver platter doctrine in Elkins, such as the avoidance of frus-
tration of state policy by federal courts and the need to prevent
"subterfuge and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation,"
are equally relevant in the instant case,75 though they were not
discussed by the court.
The potentially substantial impact of the instant decision on
the relationship between federal and state criminal justice systems
is subject to limitation because it rests primarily on statutory inter-
pretation, and Congress could clarify its intentions with regard to
Title III. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of Title III and changes could be imposed by the
judiciary in the future. As the law now stands, however, the decision
could present serious difficulties for state law enforcement authori-
ties. The Ninth Circuit now permits federal courts to assess the
actions of state officers in terms of federal law, and it refuses to
extend the scope of the exclusionary rule to aid the states in control-
ling the practices of their agents despite attempts by the states to
impose more rigorous standards on their officers. Thus the condition
that prompted the abandonment of the silver platter doctrine in
Elkins once again has become apparent: a state agent can seize
evidence in violation of his state's laws and yet avoid the state's
exclusionary rule by handing the evidence over to federal agents.
This result will dilute the effectiveness of the state's exclusionary
rule, and as the instant case demonstrates, such dilution can en-
courage state officers to obtain evidence through practices expressly
forbidden by state law. The court therefore should have considered
the effect that its ruling may have on the ability of the states to
insure that their officers abide by state law and the prescribed stan-
dards of police practice. In essence this conflict between federal and
state law focuses on the same arguments that were debated in
Elkins and in all recent cases in which the exclusionary rule was in
issue. These arguments are whether the exclusionary rule actually
deters unlawful police behavior, whether there are alternative
means of assuring obedience to state law without risking the loss of
evidence of criminal activity, and whether the courts have a respon-
75. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
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sibility to exclude credible evidence that was obtained in an unlaw-
ful manner. These issues call into question the basic rationales of
the exclusionary rule, and the failure of the Ninth Circuit to address
them places the states in the awkward position of not knowing ex-
actly what effect Title III has had on their more restrictive laws or
how much cooperation they should encourage between their officers
and federal agents. As these conditions persist, it will become in-
creasingly important for the federal courts to define clearly what
role state law enforcement officers are meant to play under the
provisions of Title III, as well as to make a definitive statement on
the future scope and viability of the exclusionary rule. As long as
the federal courts fail to respond to these basic issues, the questions
presented by the instant case concerning the relationship between
state and federal criminal justice systems and the double standard
provided to state officers will also remain unresolved.
ROBERT S. REDER
Securities Regulation-Definition of
"Security" -Promissory Notes With Maturities
Exceeding Nine Months Are Presumed to Be
Securities Under the 1934 Act Unless Issued in a
Context Closely Resembling One of Six Examples
of Commercial Transactions
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff bank purchased from a brokerage firm' three unse-
cured long-term 2 promissory notes, 3 which became worthless when
1. The brokerage firm, Weis, Voisin & Co., Inc., later known as Weis Securities, was a
member of the New York and American Stock Exchanges. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche
Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1128 (2d Cir. 1976).
2. As used herein, "long-term note" means any note that matures more than 9 months
after issuance. Notes maturing in shorter periods will be referred to as "short-term notes."
See note 25 infra.
3. The notes had an aggregate value of approximately $1 million and were subordinated
to claims by Weis's general creditors plus two other unsecured creditors that held similar
notes worth $4 million. The notes were payable 12, 15, and 18 months after their issuance
date of July 31, 1972, but only if Weis had been given 6 months prior written notice. Interest
was payable after each note matured at a rate 3% in excess of the prime commercial loan
rate of the lender at maturity but in no event less than 9% per annum. The notes could be
transferred by plaintiff only to a party approved by the New York Stock Exchange. The Bank
waived any right to setoff as well as the right to take any of Weis's property that might come
into its hands as security for the notes.
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the firm was placed in receivership. Claiming that the notes were
securities and that it had purchased the notes in reliance upon
defendant's allegedly false statements regarding the financial con-
dition of the brokerage firm, plaintiff sought damages for violation
of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.: Defendant
asserted that because the notes were not offered in the context of
an investment they were not securities regulated by the 1934 Act.'
Weis apparently sought the loans to comply with New York Stock Exchange capital
requirements, which prohibited a member firm from having "Aggregate Indebtedness" that
exceeded 2,000% of its net capital. Since "Aggregate Indebtedness" excludes "liabilities
subordinated to general creditors pursuant to a separate agreement approved by the Ex-
change," Weis was permitted to show the indebtedness to the Bank in the equity section of
its financial statements. 544 F.2d at 1128-29.
4. Defendant Touche Ross & Co., Weis's independent auditor, had certified that Weis's
financial statement and answers to an SEC questionnaire fairly presented its financial condi-
tion and conformed to generally accepted accounting principles. Plaintiff asserted that
Touche Ross knew or should have known that the Weis financial statements were false and
misleading in many respects. Id. at 1128.
5. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as the 1934
Act], 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce ... or any facility of any national securities
exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Plaintiff also alleged a violation of rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), which pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Plaintiff further alleged that defendant violated the following sections of the 1934 Act:
§ 15 (c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1975) (prohibiting use of the mails to
deceive with respect to an over-the-counter security), § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (Supp. V
1975) (amended 1975) (requiring proper maintenance and retention of records), and § 18(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970) (imposing civil liability for those making or causing to be made
fraudulent representations in required reports). 544 F.2d at 1127.
Plaintiff also alleged that defendant violated § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
[hereinafter cited as the 1933 Act], 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). 544 F.2d at 1127. Section 17(a)
is an antifraud provision similar to rule 10b-5, which was created pursuant to § 10(b) of the
1934 Act. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act has been described as the forerunner of rule lOb-5. 29
VAND. L. REV. 880, 881-82 n.10 (1976), citing 35 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 320, 323 (1967).
6. Touche Ross asserted the same defense to plaintiff's claim under the 1933 Act. 544
F.2d at 1128. The definition of a "security" as "any note" in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
see notes 11 & 25 infra and accompanying text, applies "unless the context otherwise re-
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Accordingly, defendant moved for dismissal for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.7 Finding that the note transaction resembled an
investment more closely than a commercial loan, the district court'
denied the motion to dismiss. On interlocutory appeal" to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, af-
firmed. A long-term promissory note is presumed to be a security
regulated by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
unless the context of the note transaction closely resembles one of
six enumerated examples of commercial transactions.'" Exchange
National Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 both define "security" to include "any note."" All promisssory
notes are not securities, however, because of two provisions common
to the 1933 and 1934 Acts.12 The first provision is the clause "unless
the context otherwise requires," which prefaces the definition of a
security in both Acts.' 3 Although the legislative history of the Acts
does not describe clearly the intended scope of the context clause,
courts have found that Congress enacted the securities laws to pro-
tect investors and often have resorted to the context clause to effect
this interpretation. 4 Until the 1970's courts only reluctantly applied
quires." 1933 Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970); 1934 Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970).
Defendant also relied upon the concurring opinion in Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,
532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976), which suggests that any time a bank receives a note in what
purports to be an exercise of its lending function the federal securities laws should not apply.
544 F.2d at 1136. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
7. In its motion defendant also claimed that plaintiff's allegations of fraud were incura-
bly defective. The district court, however, focused on the contention that the notes were not
securities within the 1933 or 1934 Acts. 544 F.2d at 1128. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction
would have caused dismissal because there was no diversity of citizenship. Id.
8. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York tried the case
after its transfer from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). 544 F.2d at 1127.
9. The district court certified its finding for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) (1970).
10. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
11. 1933 Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970); 1934 Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(10) (1970).
12. Numerous other exclusionary provisions exist that were not in issue in the instant
case.
13. 1933 Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970); 1934 Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970).
14. Although the Supreme Court has not considered the question of which promissory
notes are securities, it has encouraged a broad and flexible interpretation of the Acts based
on the "economic realities" of the transaction and thus has emphasized the context of the
transaction in which the alleged security was created. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975) (holding shares of "stock" in a
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the context clause to limit the provision that "security" includes
"any note."'" Recent appellate decisions, however, have emphasized
the "context" more than the "any note" language and have held
that notes were securities when the notes formed a part of invest-
ment transactions."6 In addition to the congressional intent to pro-
tect investors, the recent decisions have considered the impractical-
ity of subjecting all promissory notes to federal regulation 7 and have
hesitated to give effect to apparently inconsistent provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts. 8 To determine which notes are part of invest-
ment transactions, recent decisions have developed an approach
labelled the "commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis,"9 which
balances facts suggesting that the note was part of a commercial
housing cooperative were not "securities"); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (with-
drawable share in savings and loan association held a "security"); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946) (sale of parcels of a citrus grove development with a management contract
held to be sale of regulated investment contracts); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943) (oil and gas leases held regulated investment contracts); see Comment,
Commercial Notes and Definition of "Security" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478, 487-88 (1973).
Seeking passage of the Securities Act of 1933, President Roosevelt said in his message to
Congress of March 29, 1933, S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933) and H.R. REP.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933), quoted in 1 L. Loss, SECuarriEs REGULATION 127 (2d
ed. 1961):
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the least
possible interference to honest business.
This is but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors
What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the ancient truth that those
who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people's
money are trustees acting for others.
15. For discussions of the cases, see Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene
Security-A Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 25 (1975);
Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763 (1975); Note, Status
of the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J. 175, 184 (1975);
Comment, supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First Nat'l
Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Lino v. City Investing
Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding notes were not securities because they were sold in
a commercial context); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert.denied,
414 U.S. 908 (1973). Commentators have disputed convincingly the use of "investment" as
the test for a "security." See Hammett, supra note 15 at 59-61, 61 n.162, citing Long,
Interpreting the Statutory Definitions of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 96, 108 (1974).
17. Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974).
18. See notes 25 & 26 and text accompanying note 26 infra. Ignoring the context clauses
of both Acts would cause the 1933 Act's antifraud provisions to apply to all notes and the
nearly identical provisions of the 1934"Act to apply only to long-term notes. Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1132-33. (1976).
19. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th*Cir. 1974).
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transaction against facts suggesting that the note supported an in-
vestment. Although they have agreed that a balancing analysis is
appropriate because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
provided more objective guidelines,20 the appellate courts have used
substantially different criteria to identify an investment.2' The
courts also have differed in the weight that they give to criteria such
as risk to initial investment, 22 which party initiated the transac-
tion,2 3 and the dollar amount of the note. 24 The second provision
limiting the "any note" definition of "security" provides for nonre-
gulation of notes that mature nine months or less after issuance, '
with the exception that short-term notes remain subject to the anti-
fraud provisions of the 1933 Act.2 Legislative history indicates that
the short-term note exemption under the 1933 Act was intended to
be rather narrow, applying only to high-quality notes that could be
discounted at Federal Reserve banks; 21 the scope of the exclusion
20. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1357
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
21. Compare Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974) (adopting the 8 criteria
in Comment, supra note 14, at 511-23), with Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (setting forth a different set of criteria).
22. Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (risk a central
consideration under the "commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis).
23. Compare Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1258 n.5 (identifying
who provided the impetus to the transaction held to be "of little significance"), with C.N.S.
Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
825 (1975) (suggesting that identifying who provided the impetus is determinative under the
"commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis).
24. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam
opinion holding two notes to be securities essentially because of their face value (over $9
million) and long term (20 years)).
Detailed discussions of when a note should be considered a security under the context
clauses of the Acts are located in: Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There
a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 367 (1967); Hannan & Thomas, The
Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J.
219 (1974); Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of
Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135 (1971); Comment, supra note 14.
25. Under the 1933 Act, § 2(1) provides that any note is a security, and § 3(a)(3)
exempts from the Act's registration and prospectus requirement notes maturing in 9 months
or less. These short-term notes are excluded from the definition of a security by § 3(a)(10) of
the 1934 Act: "The term 'security' means any note ... but shall not include . . . any note
• . . which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months .... "
"Exclusion" will be used hereafter to refer simultaneously to exemption under the 1933 Act
and exclusion under the 1934 Act.
26. 1933 Act §§ 12(2), 17(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(c) (1970). For an explanation of
the significance of the different treatment of short-term notes, see note 18 supra and accom-
panying text.
27. This point is discussed thoroughly in Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and
the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 362, 380-85 (1972). The Federal Reserve Board encour-
aged the short-term note exemption, which was not included in the original draft of § 3(a)(3),
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under the 1934 Act has been equated to the scope of the 1933 Act
exemption.25 Recent emphasis on the context of note transactions
has reduced greatly if not eliminated the impact of the short-term
note exclusion of the 1934 Act.29 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has
held that certain short-term notes were securities in one case31 and
that a long-term note was not a security in another case . 1
The majority opinion in a recent Ninth Circuit case, Great
Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 32 typifies recent judicial trends by
using a "commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis to hold that
Id. at 381-82 & nn. 140-41. A letter to Sen. Duncan U. Fletcher from Chester Morrill, Secre-
tary, Federal Reserve Board, stated that the Board felt that the Act was not intended to be
applied to bankers' acceptances or short-term paper issued for the purpose of obtaining funds
for current transactions. Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95, 120 (1933).
Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961), an advisory opinion, stated in part:
The legislative history of the [19331 Act makes clear that § 3(a)(3) applies only to
prime quality negotiable paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the public, that
is, paper issued to facilitate well-recognized types of current operational business re-
quirements of a type eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.
Perhaps the strongest indication of the intended narrow scope of the exemption is a
statement in the House Report on the Act, which explains that § 3(a)(3) was intended to
apply to "short-term paper of the type available for discount at a Federal Reserve bank and
of a type which is rarely bought by private investors." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
15 (1933).
28. Because the exemption under § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act also requires that the funds
arise out of a current transaction or that proceeds be used for a current transaction, it was
unclear whether the narrow scope of the short-term note exemption of the 1933 Act could also
be attributed to the exclusion found in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act. Recent decisions, however,
have disregarded the difference in language. C.N.S. Enterprises v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc.,
508 F.2d 1354, 1356-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507
F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800-01 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Anderson v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705,
708 (D.C. Minn. 1968).
29. The short-term note exemption in § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act also has been weakened
vis-h-vis the context clause in § 2 of the 1933 Act because the scope of the exclusionary
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts have been held virtually identical. See note 28 supra.
30. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974) (held notes
were securities under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts); accord, Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546,
550-52 (10th Cir. 1974); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972), commented in 26 VAND. L. REV. 874 (1973).
31. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975), commented in 35 LA. L. REV. 570 (1975). The McClure opinion stated, "Thus,
the investment or commercial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability of the Act,
depriving of all utility the exemption based on maturity-length." 497 F.2d at 495. For a
criticism of federal court analysis of the note problem, see Hammett, supra note 15, at 74
(criticizing the "commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis and the inability of the courts
to formulate a better analysis for applying the 1933 and 1934 Acts); Tew & Freedman, In
Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic
Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 407 (1973).
32. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
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the long-term notes there in question were not securities. Setting
forth its own criteria in attempting to define "security" under the
1934 Act,33 the Kotz court noted that no single criterion was deter-
minative and that future cases might require consideration of cri-
teria other than those enumerated.34 The concurring opinion in Kotz
proposed a new test: any note received by a bank in the exercise of
its lending function should not be treated as a security under the
Acts. This test was based on the ability of banks to obtain full
disclosure from prospective borrowers and on banks' stronger bar-
gaining position. The concurring opinion further asserted that Con-
gress did not intend to include commercial financing within the
protection of the 1933 or 1934 Acts.35
The proposed A.L.I. Federal Securities Code contains several
provisions indicating when a note is a security. First, the Code re-
tains the context clause preface to the definition of a security.36
Professor Loss, the Reporter, stated that the problem of determining
which notes are securities "does not lend itself to precise statutory
solution" 3 and preserved the "context" language to invite "sound
judicial discrimination. ' 38 Secondly, section 297(b)(3) excludes
from the definition of a security a note issued in a "mercantile
transaction. '39 The comment to section 297(b)(3) indicates that
"mercantile transaction" was designed to solve the troublesome
commercial-investment dichotomy. 0 The Code, however, does not
define "mercantile transaction," a term that would have to be inter-
preted by the courts. Thirdly, the Code exempts from its registra-
tion provisions, but not from its antifraud provisions,4' "commercial
paper,"42 which is defined to include demand notes and short-term
33. The criteria were: (1) time, (2) collateralization, (3) form of obligation, (4) circum-
stances of issuance, (5) relationship between amount borrowed and size of borrower's
business, and (6) contemplated use of the proceeds of the note. Id. at 1257-58.
34. Two more recent decisions also used a commercial-investment dichotomy analysis
to hold that long-term notes were not securities. Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's, Inc., [19761
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,761 (7th Cir. Oct. 29, 1976); Tri-County State Bank v. Hertz,
[19761 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,772 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 1976).
35. 532 F.2d at 1260-62 (Wright, J., concurring).
36. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 201(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). The Code slightly varies
the wording: "unless the context requires otherwise .. .
37. Id. (Comment).
38. Id.
39. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 297(b)(3) (Reporter's Revision of Text of Tent. Drafts Nos.
1-3, 1974) [hereinafter cited as RD 1-3].
40. Id. at note 2.
41. The Code adopts the approach found in the 1933 Act by not exempting short-term
notes from its antifraud provisions.
42. Only commercial paper in denominations of $100,000 or more is exempted. RD 1-3,
supra note 39, § 301(1).
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notes. In the absence of more precise federal securities laws or
Supreme Court guidance, federal courts continue to struggle with
the context clause, at times applying it in derogation of more ex-
plicit provisions such as those apparently precluding regulation of
many short-term note transactions under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
IX. THE INSTANT OPINION
Before proposing its own test for determining when a note is a
security the instant court discredited two other tests.44 The court
gave three reasons why the "commercial-investment dichotomy"
analysis"' used in previous cases was inadequate. First, the court
criticized the criteria used by most courts as being subject to numer-
ous exceptions." Secondly, the dichotomy analysis does not assign
relative weights to the criteria to be used by the district courts to
determine when a note is a security. Thirdly, the court found that
the list of relevant criteria to be applied might vary depending on
the facts of each case.4" The instant opinion concluded that an anal-
ysis using dubious criteria in unpredictable combinations provides
little assistance to district courts or to counsel.
Having discounted the "commercial-investment dichotomy"
analysis, the court considered the proposition in the Kotz concur-
ring opinion that notes received by banks in the exercise of their
lending function should not be regulated by the 1933 or 1934 Acts.4"
Noting that the securities laws were intended for the protection of
the borrower as well as the lender," the instant court found that
43. Id. § 216A.
44. Criticism of the "commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis was preceded by
discussions of the inconsistent scopes of the 1933 and 1934 antifraud provisions, see notes 18
& 26 supra, the legislative history of the Acts, and a description of recent appellate decisions
dealing with the issue of when a note is a security. The opinion attributed the short-term note
exemption in § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act to a Federal Reserve Board letter to the Chairmen of
the House and Senate Committees considering the Act. See note 27 supra. The court also
indicated that the lack of legislative history for the 1934 Act exclusion in § 3(a)(10) made it
unclear whether the omission of the "current transaction" clause of § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act
was intended to vary the scope of § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act from the scope of § 3(a)(3) of the
1933 Act. The court noted that recent appellate decisions recognized that Securities Act
Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961) had "at least some application" to § 3(a)(10) of the 1934
Act, 544 F.2d at 1134.
45. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
46. For example, the court discredited the investment of "risk-capital" as a reliable
criterion by pointing out that character loans by banks involved considerable risk but were
hardly securities transactions.
47. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
48. 544 F.2d at 1137.
49. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
50. For cases involving claims of fraud by makers of promissory notes claimed to be
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although the lending bank often can secure adequate disclosure
from the borrower, the borrower rarely gets adequate information
about the lender. The court also suggested that banks, even with
their advantageous disclosure and bargaining positions, are inade-
quately protected against fraud by borrowers. Therefore the court
concluded that all promissory notes purchased in the exercise of a
bank's lending function should not be excluded from regulation as
securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.5 '
Because the two foregoing modes of analyzing note transactions
seemed unworkable, the instant court chose to adhere more closely
to the description of security as including any note'12 and thus deem-
phasized the context clause. Accordingly, the instant court created
a strong presumption that the context clause will have little bearing
on which notes are securities by emphasizing the word "requires"
in "unless the context otherwise requires." To effectuate its inter-
pretation of the context clause, the court ruled that one who asserts
that a short-term note is within or that a long-term note is not
within the 1934 Act has the burden of showing that the context
so requires . 3 The court enumerated situations in which the context
of a long-term note transaction would satisfy defendant's burden of
showing that the transaction was not regulated:
the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage,the
short-term note secured by a lien on a business or some of its assets, the note
evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured
by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an
open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business (particularly if,
as in the case of the customer of a broker, it is collateralized). A
Only if a long-term promissory note bore a "close family resem-
blance"55 to one of the six enumerated examples would it not be
treated as a security under the 1934 Act. Because the instant notes
did not resemble closely one of the six exceptions" the court held
securities, see C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Lino v. City Inv. Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Movielab,
Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
51. 544 F.2d at 1137.
52. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
53. The court also ruled that a party asserting that any note is not within the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 Act has the burden of showing that the context requires that the note
not be considered a "security." 544 F.2d at 1137-38; see notes 25 & 26 supra and accompany-
ing text.
54. 544 F.2d at 1138.
55. Id.
56. For a description of the notes see note 3 supra.
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that the notes were securities regulated under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act.-7
Describing its analysis of note transactions as clearer and easier
to apply than the "commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis of
recent decisions in other circuits, the instant court nevertheless sug-
gested that adoption of section 297(b)(3) of the Federal Securities
Code would be a more desirable solution. The court added that a
grant of power to explicate the term "mercantile transaction" in
section 297(b)(3) should be given to the SEC."9
IV. COMMENT
The instant opinion, which discards the typical "commercial-
investment dichotomy" analysis,"° may be separated into two com-
ponents. The first component is the presumption against operation
of the context clause,6' or, stated otherwise, a presumption that
long-term notes are and short-term notes are not securities. By rais-
ing this presumption the court effectively preserves the short-term
note exclusions, 2 which have been weakened considerably by recent
decisions." The exclusions, however, may have been overempha-
sized in the instant opinion. Numerous courts have found the scope
of the 1934 Act's short-term note exclusion identical to the narrow
scope of the 1933 Act's short-term note exemption. 4 The liberal
application of the securities laws intended by its drafters further
supports a narrow interpretation of the exclusionary provisions."'
The instant court's presumption that long-term notes are securities
does not conflict with the intent of the Acts, but presuming that
short-term notes are not securities does appear to contradict legisla-
tive intent. Eliminating the presumption with respect to short-term
57. The portion of the court's opinion supporting note 53 supra suggests that the court
also held that the notes were securities under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act as well as under the
provisions of the 1934 Act. The instant court probably did not decide whether the notes were
securities under the 1933 Act, however, because only § 10(b) of the 1934 Act was linked
directly with the 6 note transactions spelled out by the court. 544 F.2d at 1138. Also, the
instant court expressed some doubt as to whether a civil damages remedy existed under §
17(a). Id. at 1137-38 n.18. Possibly the court felt no need to rule on the § 17(a) claim because
of its close resemblance to rule 10b-5 promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
58. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
59. Explication would be accomplished by rule in the same manner recommended in §
216A of the Federal Securities Code for the exemption of commercial paper. RD 1-3, § 216A.
60. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
61. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
62. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
63. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 14 supra.
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notes would be pointless since the purpose of the court's presump-
tion scheme, to revitalize the short-term note exclusions, is served
effectively only when applied to short-term notes. In the future,
therefore, courts should hesitate to presume notes are or are not
securities because of length of time to maturity."
The second component of the instant analysis is the enumera-
tion of six examples of commercial note transactions that rebut the
presumption of regulation as transactions involving securities under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Enumeration offers several advantages
over the "commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis recently
used in other circuits. Far more precise than balancing, the enumer-
ation technique facilitates identification of notes that are securities:
if a long-term note does not closely resemble one of the examples,
it is a security. Furthermore, enumeration works well to restrict
the scope of exclusions in statutes such as the 1934 Act, a remedial
statute intended to have broad application. Nevertheless, exclusion
by enumeration also has a major shortcoming-inflexibility. For
example, new types of long-term note transactions may develop that
conceptually are not securities but do not fall into one of the enu-
merated categories of note transactions excluded from regulation.
Accordingly, the presumption that such notes are securities may
result in regulation as securities in spite of their commercial na-
ture. 7 Adding these new types of long-term note transactions to the
list of unregulated commercial transactions would solve the prob-
lem, assuming that the organization responsible for making such
additions responds promptly to emergent types of commercial
notes. The enumeration scheme, however, does not work well when
applied to short-term note transactions. Under the presumption of
the instant analysis that short-term notes would not be securities
"unless the context otherwise requires," all short-term notes that
clearly are securities would have to be enumerated. Because of the
varied assortment of securities, even enumerating the short-term
note transactions that clearly are securities would be infeasible. "
An alternative to the instant decision would be to hold that all
66. The proposed Federal Securities Code has taken this position with respect to its
antifraud provisions. See note 41 supra.
67. Some commentators have felt the inflexibility of enumeration mandated the adop-
tion of the more common "dichotomy" analysis, which avoids inflexibility by balancing the
relevant facts of the transaction. See Coffey, supra note 24, at 369-70; Long, supra note 16,
at 100.
68. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
69. It is this impossibility of enumerating all securities transactions that prompted
Professor Coffey to suggest the use of conceptual criteria by the courts. See Coffey, supra note
24 passim; Long, supra note 16, at 100.
[Vol. 30:110
RECENT CASES
notes are presumed to be securities unless within one of the
enumerated examples of commercial note transactions. Thus the
precision attributable to enumeration under the instant analysis
would be preserved, and the application of the securities laws to
promissory notes would be broadened. By eliminating the need to
enumerate short-term note transactions in which securities are in-
volved, the major drawback of enumeration would be avoided. Al-
though the short-term note exclusions under the 1933 and 1934 Acts
would not operate to distinguish notes maturing in nine months or
less from notes with longer maturities, the probable intent of Con-
gress-to exclude high-quality commercial paper7 from regula-
tion-would be preserved. Furthermore, presuming that notes of all
maturities are securities comports with the approach taken by the
Federal Securities Code7' as well as recent decisions made under
existing securities law.72
The instant court appropriately suggests adoption of the exclu-
sion in section 297(b)(3) of the Federal Securities Code for notes
created in "mercantile transactions," a term that better articulates
the present application of the context clause to notes. More impor-
tantly, the instant opinion recommends that Congress empower the
SEC to explicate by rule "mercantile transaction." If the SEC were
empowered to enumerate73 categories of notes created in mercantile
transactions, the difficult question of whether a note is a security
could be clarified by a single, authoritative source. The examples
set forth in the instant opinion might provide a foundation for the
SEC rule, which could be expanded as appropriate to include new
types of mercantile transactions.
STEPHEN C. MORTON
70. See note 27 supra.
71. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
72. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
73. Use of conceptual criteria rather than enumerated examples by the SEC to define
"mercantile transaction" probably would pose interpretive problems like those faced under
the "commercial-investment dichotomy" analysis. See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying
text.
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Securities Law-Securities Fraud-Proof of
Causation in 10b-5 Nondisclosure Cases Involving
Trading on Impersonal Markets
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs' brought an action under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 19342 and rule 10b-5 3 promulgated
thereunder for damages suffered from the sale of stock interests in
Old Line Life Insurance Company (Old Line)4 during a period in
which Old Line was negotiating a merger.' During the negotiations,
but two months prior to plaintiffs' sales, defendants purchased Old
Line' stock allegedly on the basis of undisclosed insider information
concerning the merger, in violation of the rule 10b-5 "disclose or
abstain" standard8 for insiders trading in the open market., Plain-
1. Plaintiffs are 5 individual investors who purchased a total of 13,818 shares of Old
Line stock. Two of the plaintiffs bought stock in May 1972. The other plaintiffs purchased
their stock in 1967.
2. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as the 1934
Acti, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
4. Plaintiffs sold their stock in June 1972.
5. U.S. Life Corporation (USLIFE) and Old Line began commercial negotiations for
merger on April 19, 1972. The merger first was announced publicly on June 29, 1972.
6. Defendants purchased 8,625 shares of Old Line stock during the period April 21-27,
1972.
7. The chairman of USLIFE contacted defendant James C. Bradford (Bradford) con-
cerning the possible acquisition of Old Line by USLIFE; Bradford served as intermediary
between the negotiating parties.
8. See text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
9. The SEC filed a rule 10b-5 enforcement action against defendants which was termi-
RECENT CASES
tiffs contended that insiders who trade in an impersonal market on
the basis of material inside information, without first disclosing
such information, are liable to investors who suffer loss in the imper-
sonal market by selling without knowledge of the material informa-
tion, even though the insiders do not purchase the shares sold by
plaintiff sellers. Defendants argued that they could not be liable to
plaintiffs because defendant's purchases had no causal relationship
with plaintiffs' losses.' 0 The district court held defendants liable for
trading on the basis of material inside information without first
disclosing that information." On appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held, reversed and remanded. An
insider who trades in an impersonal market on the basis of undis-
closed material information in violation of rule 10b-5 is not liable
to an investor who trades in an impersonal market unaware of the
material information and otherwise unaffected by the wrongful acts
of the insider, because there is no causal connection between the
insider's wrongdoing and the investor's loss. Fridrich v. Bradford,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,723 (6th Cir. Sept. 15,
1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3460 (1976).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 2 and rule 10b-513 do not
expressly provide a civil remedy for their violation, courts have
implied a remedy and have used the common law tort of deceit to
provide the elements of the cause of action. 4 The standard of con-
nated by the filing of a stipulation of settlement and the entry of a consent judgment perma-
nently enjoining defendants from violating § 10(b) in connection with Old Line securities and
ordering the creation of a fund to disperse payments to persons who filed claims under the
terms of the consent judgment. Those entitled to file claims were defined by the judgment
as: (a) any person other than a customer of J.C. Bradford and Co. who sold any shares of
Old Line to J.C. Bradford and Co. in the period from April 21, 1972, to April 27, 1972, and
(b) any customer of Bradford and Co. who sold any shares of Old Line to Bradford and Co.
in the period of April 21, 1972, to June 29, 1972. Fridrich v. Bradford, [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,723, at 90,518 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 1976).
10. Defendants also argued in their brief that insiders owe a duty to disclose only to
persons with whom they deal, and that since defendants did not deal with plaintiffs, no duty
was breached. Brief for Appellants at 13, Fridrich v. Bradford, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,723 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 1976).
11. The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee entered judgment in the
aggregate amount of $361,186.75. The district court also found that defendants had violated
rule 10b-6 by virtue of their continuous trading activity in Old Line stock from April through
November 1972, the period in which the terms of the merger were being established. The
instant court reversed the finding of liability under rule 10b-6 by applying its causation test.
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,723, at 90,519, 90,528.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1970).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
14. This remedy was first implied in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
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duct in civil cases involving nondisclosure of material inside infor-
mation is the "disclose or abstain" rule developed in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,' 5 an SEC enforcement action charging Texas Gulf
Sulphur (TGS) and thirteen individuals with purchasing TGS stock
and calls on the strength of inside information of favorable explora-
tory drilling results. In order to insure that all investors trading on
impersonal markets have relatively equal access to material infor-
mation, the TGS court held that anyone possessing material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public or abstain
from trading in or recommending the subject security."6
Proof of a causal connection between defendant's wrongdoing
and plaintiff's loss seemed to be a "rock-bottom limiting factor" in
early attempts to impose civil liability in nondisclosure cases. 7 In
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.,'" a stockholders'
derivative action for misstatements and omissions of material facts
in connection with the sale of stock, the court held that a "sem-
blance of privity" between the vendor and purchaser is requisite to
such an action. 9 The Farnsworth court found such requisite causal
relationship lacking and granted a defense motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.2" Rey-
nolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur" is a more recent judicial recognition
of the causation requirement in private rule 10b-5 actions based on
nondisclosure. In Reynolds, plaintiff sought damages for profits
(E.D. Pa. 1946). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971).
15. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
16. Id. at 848.
17. Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule lOb-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167, 173 (1974). This
connection requirement has been stated in terms of "causation" and "reliance." See Shapiro
v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974).
18. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
19. Id. at 706. The court cited Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951), as an example of what it meant by "semblance of privity:"
The common stockholders should be permitted to amend. . . by alleging facts showing
that the defendants deliberately used the prospectus of registration statement for the
purpose of fraudulently inducing the purchase of common stock sold by the defendants
and that, in this fraudulent purpose, the defendants were successful vis a vis the com-
mon stockholders here.
99 F. Supp. at 706. The requirement of formal privity has been discredited because of the
impersonal nature of markets. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th
Cir. 1971). See generally Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur - The Second Round: Privity and State
of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 435-44 (1968).
20. 99 F. Supp. at 706-07.
21. 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd as modified, 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
22. Reynolds is a private 10b-5 action arising from the same transactions challenged
by the SEC in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur. See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
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he claimed to have lost on stock he sold during a period in which
defendants were trading on inside information. The Reynolds court
held it necessary for plaintiff to prove "some causative effect ' 23
between defendants' wrongdoing and plaintiffs' damages in order
to recover. The court also held that such causation does not follow
from a finding in an earlier action brought by the SEC24 that de-
fendants had violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by purchasing
stock without first publicly disclosing the inside information they
possessed. 21
The Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States2
eased the strict requirement of proof of causation in nondisclosure
cases. In Affiliated Ute, terminated Ute Indians" created the Ute
Distribution Corporation (UDC)25 to manage the assets29 of the tribe
as part of a plan for distributing the assets to individual terminated
Utes. UDC issued ten shares of its stock to each terminated Ute and
agreed that First Security Bank of Utah would be its transfer agent.
First Security and some of its employees purchased stock from a
group of the terminated Utes without disclosing the higher price at
which the securities were being traded in a secondary market devel-
oped by the bank." There was no positive proof that the terminated
Utes had relied on the fraud of the defendants in deciding to sell
their stock. The Court concluded:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose,
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary
is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of this decision ....
The obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the
the requisite element of causation in fact.3 '
Since Affiliated Ute, the lower courts have, with one excep-
tion,32 adopted a presumption in nondisclosure cases that causation
23. The court pointed out that "some causative effect" does not require the establish-
ment of privity of contract, but did not define exactly what the term does mean. The court
did conclude that materiality is not the test. 309 F. Supp. at 558-59.
24. See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
25. 309 F. Supp. at 558.
26. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
27. The designation "terminated Ute" is used in this Comment in place of the statutory
term "mixed-blood." See id. at 133 n.3.
28. The UDC was authorized by The Ute Indian Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-
77aa (1970).
29. The assets consisted of oil, gas, and mineral rights and unadjudicated or unliqui-
dated claims against the Government. 406 U.S. at 135.
30. Id. at 144-49.
31. Id. at 153-54.
32. The exception is Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d
514 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
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in fact is established if the undisclosed information is material,
rather than requiring plaintiff to present positive proof of reliance.3
The impossibility of proving reliance in such cases has been given
as the rationale for the policy. 14 In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith,"5 plaintiffs, purchasers of common stock of Doug-
las Corporation, alleged that defendants, underwriters of a Douglas
debenture issue, had divulged inside information concerning revised
downward earnings projections to certain of their institutional
investors without disclosing the "inside information to the public. 6
The district court, 37 in denying a defense motion for judgment on the
pleadings, held that the act of trading without disclosing material
inside information caused the injury to plaintiffs .3 The Second Cir-
cuit further concluded that the "causation in fact" holding of
Affiliated Ute precluded any arguments defendants might make
that no causal connection existed between their conduct and plain-
tiffs' damage, 3 even though Shapiro did not involve a face-to-face
transaction as did Affiliated Ute. ° Additionally, the Second Circuit
recognized that the resulting judgment for damages might be so
substantial that they may constitute a "Draconian liability" to de-
fendants, but left the issue of proper measure of damages to be
Financial Industrial Fund involved the same transactions as Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974),
but the court held, without mentioning Affiliated Ute, that plaintiff had the burden of
demonstrating reliance on the acts or inaction of the defendant in order to prove causation.
33. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d
402 (3d Cir. 1973); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892 (D. Utah 1973). See generally Note, The
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 H~Av. L. REv. 584, 590-
91(1975).
34. Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840
(1975). In cases involving affirmative misrepresentations, it can be demonstrated that the
injured party relied upon the affirmative statements of the defendant; in nondisclosure cases,
however, it is impossible to demonstrate reliance since there is nothing affirmative upon
which the injured party could rely. Id.; see 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRmEs LAW-FRAUD: SEC
RULE lob-5 § 8.7(2), at 220 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
35. 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afJ'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
36. Plaintiffs purchased stock during the same period of time that defendants divulged
the inside information to their selected investors. These institutions sold more than 165,000
shares of Douglas common stock during that period. 495 F.2d at 232.
37. District Judge Tenney wrote an extensive opinion on which the circuit court relied
heavily. 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
38. Id. at 278.
39. 495 F.2d at 238.
40. In Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974), the Third Circuit also
presumed reliance to prove causation, but took the position that the defendant should be
allowed to rebut this presumption if he can establish that plaintiff would have acted in the
same manner had he known the undisclosed information. Id. at 410.
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determined at an evidentiary hearing in the district court.4' The
instant case gave the Sixth Circuit the opportunity to address the
potentially unlimited liability of an insider who trades in an imper-
sonal market on the basis of undisclosed material information and
to determine the extent of the applicability of rule 10b-5 in private
causes of action based on such trading.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court 2 rejected the trend toward presumption of
reliance to prove causation and adopted the traditional requirement
of Farnsworth and Reynolds that plaintiffs must prove that defen-
dants' acts were causally connected with any loss claimed by plain-
tiffs. In rejecting Shapiro, the court determined that the act of
trading by insiders, not the failure to disclose, constituted the viola-
tion of rule 10b-5, since it was the act of trading that resulted in the
illicit profits. The court observed that an insider's duty to disclose
is not absolute, but alternative. If the insider does not trade he has
the absolute right to keep certain material information secret, and
investors must accept the risk of trading in an open market unaware
of some undisclosed material information. Thus although the court
recognized that defendants' trading on the basis of material undis-
closed information impaired the integrity of the market and violated
the rule, their trading did not alter plaintiffs' expectations when
they sold their stock, and in no way influenced plaintiffs' trading
decisions. In reaching this decision, the court interpreted Affiliated
Ute more narrowly than did the Shapiro court and distinguished it
on the ground that the defendants there had perpetrated a scheme
to induce plaintiffs to sell their stock, whereas in the instant case
the defendants had no relationship with the plaintiffs. The court
acknowledged that rule 10b-5 should encompass open market trans-
actions, but rejected the view that civil remedies in rule 10b-5 ac-
tions should be coextensive in their reach to those of the SEC when
the application of such a view would lead to an unjust result. The
41. The court concluded that since the case came to it on an appeal of an interlocutory
order denying defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the issue of relief was not
before it. Also, given the potential liability at stake, the court felt that an evidentiary hearing
should be held. 495 F.2d at 241-42.
The potential liability for the insiders in Shapiro, in excess of the profit on their transac-
tions, was approximately $9 million. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trad-
ing on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 308 n.83 (1974).
42. Judge Engel delivered the opinion of the court in which Judge Peck concurred;
Judge Celebreeze filed a separate concurring opinion.
43. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,723, at 90,524.
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court found that extension of civil liability would result in two unfa-
vorable consequences: (1) creation of a windfall to those investors
aware of their nebulous rights; and (2) imposition of potentially
unlimited "punitive" damages. Thus the court refused to extend the
private remedy by holding that no causal connection exists in a
nondisclosure case involving insiders trading on the impersonal
market in which plaintiffs neither dealt with the insiders nor were
otherwise influenced by the wrongful acts of the insiders.
The concurring opinion of Judge Celebrezze 4 emphasized the
need to impose a rational limitation on the scope of civil liability
under rule 10b-5 for insiders trading in the open market. He inter-
preted the majority opinion to hold that persons who trade on an
open market weeks after the insider has concluded his trading activ-
ity must establish more than the materiality of the undisclosed
information to demonstrate that their losses were caused by the
insiders' trading. Determining that the date the insiders cease trad-
ing rather than the date the information is finally disclosed should
be the focus in cutting off liability," Judge Celebreeze concluded
that recovery should be limited to those investors who traded during
the period when insiders were trading in or recommending trading
in the stock.
IV. COMMENT
With this decision, the Sixth Circuit has expressed its unwill-
ingness to extend to nondisclosure cases in which there is no rela-
tionship between plaintiffs and insiders the presumption that caus-
ation in fact is established if the nondisclosure is material. In so
doing, the court adopted the most restrictive position regarding re-
covery in private civil actions brought under rule 10b-5.11 Since
proof of causation in nondisclosure cases involving impersonal mar-
kets is almost impossible,47 this position virtually eliminates recov-
eries by investors against insiders in private 10b-5 actions. This
result is supportable by the argument made by the instant court
that the investors were not injured by the insiders' acts and thus not
entitled to recovery since the investors would have traded whether
44. Id. at 90,528-32.
45. Judge Celebrezze based the conclusion on the theory that only when the insider
enters the market and creates an informational imbalance does the insider have a duty to
disclose. When the insider ceases trading, the informational imbalance ends and the market
returns to its normal state. Id. at 90,530-31.
46. See generally 2 BROMBERG, supra note 34, at § 8.7(2), at 220; Note, note 41 supra.
47. See note 34 supra.
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or not the insiders were in the market. The criticism that the posi-
tion immunizes from liability insiders who trade on national ex-
changes or over the counter in violation of rule 10b-5 outweighs the
supporting argument, however, and renders this solution to the lia-
bility problem unacceptable. In contrast, the Shapiro decision im-
plies a full recovery to all investors who traded during the period in
which the insider violated rule 10b-5.18 This position finds support
in the argument that the purpose of rule 10b-5 is to insure investors
who trade on impersonal markets that they have equal access to
material information and to protect them in the event that insiders
trade on the basis of nondisclosed information. 9 The existence of
potentially unlimited liability of insiders as a result of this position,
however, eliminates it as a satisfactory answer to the liability ques-
tion. Such unlimited liability could have catastrophic effects on
corporations, officers, directors, employees, and tippees who assume
insider status,50 and infers a punitive connotation to the damages in
contradiction to the remedial intent of the statute.5'
The harshness of the two extremes represented by the instant
opinion and Shapiro suggests that a compromise setting rational
limits on civil liability in private nondisclosure cases is preferable.
Judge Celebreeze's concurring opinion suggests one such compro-
mise.2 His approach is appealing in that it restricts the liability of
insiders to the period of time during which the informational imbal-
ance existed as a result of the insider trading.53 This approach,
however, leaves open the possibility of catastrophic liability to insi-
ders" and therefore is not a satisfactory solution to the liability
question. Another compromise approach that has been discussed is
48. See note 41 supra & accompanying text.
49. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
50. An example of such catastrophic effects was the potential liability of Texas Gulf
Sulphur from private suits arising from the activities discussed in text accompanying note
15 supra. Those damages could have been equal to $130 per share for every share traded
during the period of violation. Since approximately 3 million shares were traded during that
period, damages could have amounted to over $390 million. This figure was approximately
$150 million more than the net worth of TGS at that time. Ruder, note 19 supra, at 429.
51. See 3 BROMBERG, supra note 34, at § 9.1, at 229 (1975).
52. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
53. See note 45 supra.
54. If the subject security is actively traded, even a mild fluctuation in price over a short
period of time could result in enormous potential liability to insiders. For example, over a
specific 4-day period, United Airlines common stock had atrading volume of 5,155,000 shares,
and increased in value over $2.35 per share. Wall Street J., Nov. 16, 1976, at 45, col 4; Nov.
17, 1976, at 45, col. 3; Nov. 18, 1976, at 45, col. 3; Nov. 19, 1976, at 45, col. 2. Therefore,
potential liability in a 1Ob-5 private action could be over $12 million for a 4-day period.
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the limitation of recovery to investors in privity with the insiders."
Although this approach solves the problem of proof of causation and
effectively limits potential liability, the lack of meaning of the term
privity in impersonal market trading strikes a fatal blow to the
concept. Additionally, even if privity could be effectively defined in
the impersonal market context, the administrative problems of trac-
ing specific shares of stock would render this approach unworkable.
The most persuasive compromise approach to the liability
question is that suggested by the proposed Federal Securities Code,
which limits the insiders' damages to the profits realized from their
illegal trading." This approach has several advantages. First, it does
not insulate from liability insiders who trade illegally, as does the
instant opinion. If the nondisclosure is material, causation is estab-
lished and liability is imposed on the insider. Second, the liability
is rationally limited and the potential catastrophic results of
Shapiro are avoided. Finally, because the insiders' illicit profits
represent the net effect on the market of the insiders' illegal trading,
since beyond these illicit profits all losses suffered by uninformed
investors result in offsetting gains to other investors, the market
balance is restored by retrieving the insiders' illegal profits, even
though individual investors might suffer. The major disadvantages
of this approach, in addition to the possible losses of some individ-
ual investors, are the administrative problems of determination of
the injured parties and distribution of pro rata shares of the recovery
to them. As an alternative, the illicit profits could be channelled
back into the corporation whose stock was illegally traded if the
corporation itself did not violate rule 10b-5.17 On balance, this ap-
proach of the proposed Federal Securities Code to liability of insi-
ders is preferable to the alternatives and should be adopted to pre-
vent the potential harshness to insiders of Shapiro and the harsh-
ness to investors of the instant opinion.
RANDOLPH C. COLEY
55. Note, note 41 supra, at 311-13.
56. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1402(f)(2)(B) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) provides:
(2) For purposes of section 1402(b), the measure of damages as defined in paragraph
(1) is
(B) limited (after application of clause (A)) to the extent of the securities that the
defendant sold or bought.
57. See 2 BROMBERO, supra note 34, at § 8.7(2), at 218.
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